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Abstract  
We use a proprietary dataset to explore (i) the financial covenant structure and (ii) the 
determinants of their restrictiveness in leveraged buyouts. With respect to (i) we find that the 
covenant structure is more standardized in sponsored than in non-sponsored loans: the former 
show less variation in the included types and combinations of covenants and include more 
financial covenants than the latter. With respect to (ii) we measure financial covenant 
restrictiveness precisely as the distance between threshold and financial forecast. We show 
that two competing mechanisms, reduced information asymmetry costs and increased 
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1.  Introduction 
Since the 1980s the private equity market has grown tremendously in terms of size and 
geographic reach. Strömberg (2008) estimates the total aggregated global value of firms 
acquired by private equity from 1970 to 2007 at $3.6 trillion, of which a substantial part ($1.6 
trillion) was transacted in the period from 2005 to June 2007. After this second leveraged 
buyout (LBO) boom had burst with the financial crisis, financial covenants received 
increasing attention in academia and the media.
1  
Financial covenants are financial ratios which serve as an instrument for the allocation of 
control rights between lenders and borrowers (Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Hart, 1995). They 
reveal the state of the firm during the borrowing period. If the state of the firm is ‘good’, 
equity holders remain in control and might even reap private benefits. In contrast, if the state 
of the firm is ‘bad’, i.e. financial covenants are violated and the company is in ‘technical 
default’, control rights shift to lenders, who then have the right to call their loans. If the call is 
executed, the borrower might be forced into bankruptcy. 
Although financial covenants are an important value driver for borrowers and lenders 
(see e.g. Zhang 2009), little is known about the setting of financial covenants, i.e. their 
structure and the determinants of their restrictiveness, in LBOs. This paper provides a detailed 
analysis of both issues. Why should we expect the covenant setting for private equity 
sponsored loans to be any different than the covenant setting for traditional, non-sponsored 
corporate loans? There are two competing arguments which we refer to as reduced 
information asymmetry costs and increased financial risk.  
                                                 
1  For instance see the NY Times article ‘Analysts will be watching loan covenants in 2009’, by Natalie Harrison 
and Jane Baird, November 30
 2008. This prediction has been supported by a recent PWC industry survey 
which highlighted that 75% of the private equity respondents had to deal with covenant breaches within their 
portfolio companies or were otherwise required to enter negotiations with financing banks in 2009. See 
http://www.pwc.de/fileserver/RepositoryItem/Pr_Equity_Trend_Report_2010.pdf?itemId=13602751  3 
 
The reduced information asymmetry costs argument emanates from the repeated, highly 
frequent interactions between private equity investors and (i) specific banks and (ii) the 
lending market in general as compared to traditional corporate borrowers (Ivashina and 
Kovner, 2010). With respect to (i), banks are able to accumulate and reuse valuable 
information about private equity investors through repeated interactions. With each additional 
transaction, they will gain more sponsor-specific information leading to lower screening 
and/or monitoring costs in future transactions (e.g. James, 1987; Ivashina and Kovner, 2010). 
With respect to (ii), private equity investors mitigate informational asymmetry costs through 
their general reputation in lending markets. A good reputation is acquired over time through 
repeated borrowing and a track record of repayment. Borrowers benefit from their reputation 
in terms of better lending conditions and therefore face less incentives to jeopardize their 
capital market reputation through risk-shifting, such as investing in excessively risky projects. 
Again, given their stronger interaction with lending markets, both in terms of size and 
frequency, private equity sponsors might benefit more from their reputation in terms of looser 
covenant settings than traditional corporate borrowers (e.g. Diamond, 1989; Demiroglu and 
James, 2010a). Taken together, the reduction of information asymmetry costs – be it either in 
the form of lower screening, monitoring and/or reputation-related costs – implies a looser 
covenant setting.  
The increased financial risk argument is based on the fact that private equity investors 
increase the leverage levels of their portfolio companies considerably. There are two 
underlying reasons why private equity investors lever companies up. They are interested in 
capitalizing on the incentive and tax benefits of debt (Jensen, 1986; Modigliani and Miller, 
1963).
2 Additionally, private equity sponsors face agency problems with limited partners due 
to their option-like compensation structure which induces them to over-invest (Axelson et al., 
                                                 
2  i.e. they are interested in increasing leverage up to the margin where the tax and incentive benefits equal the 
bankruptcy costs. 4 
 
2009). In consequence, an increase in the leverage levels – be it due to either the tax and 
incentive benefits of debt and/or agency problems on behalf of the private equity sponsors – 
leads to stronger incentives for borrowers to engage in risk-shifting. In anticipation of this, 
lenders will include tighter covenant settings in the credit agreements.  
On the background of the tension between these two predictions, this paper tries to 
answer two main questions: how does the covenant menu in terms of individual covenant 
types and combinations differ in sponsored and non-sponsored loans? How restrictive are 
covenants in sponsored loans and what is the effect of the competing reduced information 
asymmetry costs and increased financial risk arguments on covenant restrictiveness? 
In order to address these questions, we construct an LBO and several benchmark 
datasets. The proprietary LBO dataset consists of 130 German LBO transactions from 2000 to 
2008 which covers approximately 40% of the German LBO market. Germany represents a 
fruitful institutional setting for understanding covenants since it is an economy with strong 
creditor rights (e.g. La Porta et al., 1997; Djankov et al., 2006) where covenants can be 
directly enforced in the case of a default (Lerner et al., 2009) and hence are subject to rigorous 
ex-ante negotiations. Our LBO dataset includes detailed covenant information gathered from 
the credit agreements and financial forecasts for the portfolio companies negotiated between 
the banks and private equity sponsors. The sample comprehends 23 lead arrangers and 66 
private equity sponsors which largely operate on an international basis. We are not aware of 
any fundamental reason why the findings based on this sample cannot be extended to other 
countries. The benchmark datasets consist of non-sponsored loans with covenant information 
extracted from Dealscan.  
In order to answer our first question we compare the covenant menu of sponsored and 
non-sponsored loans in terms of the following seven covenant types highlighted by 
researchers (Chava and Roberts, 2008; Demerjian, 2010) and practitioners:  (1) Debt to 5 
 
EBITDA (D/EBITDA), (2) EBITDA to interest (EBITDA/I), (3) Unlevered Cash Flow to 
Debt Service (CashFlowCoverage), (4) Capex, (5) Net Worth, (6) Debt to Equity (D/E) and 
(7) Current Ratio covenants.  
We document that the covenant structures in non-sponsored loans are less standardized 
than in sponsored loans. With regards to the individual use of covenants, we encounter only 
the first four covenants in sponsored loans while we observe all seven covenants in non-
sponsored loans. With regards to the combinations of covenants, we find that the most 
frequent combination in sponsored loans - which contains D/EBITDA, EBITDA/I, 
CashFlowCoverage, and Capex covenants - is found in 68% of the sponsored sample. In 
contrast, the most frequent combination in non-sponsored loans - which comprehends 
D/EBITDA and EBITDA/I covenants - is encountered in only 13% of the sponsored sample. 
In line with this observation, we document that sponsored loans restrict more financial ratios 
(3.64) than non-sponsored loans (2.81).  
Why is this the case? One intuitive explanation is that the increased financial risk 
argument may outweigh the reduced information asymmetry costs argument. We examine this 
conjecture by comparing the sponsored loans with a subsample of non-sponsored loans where 
the borrowers have similar financial risk. Surprisingly, at least to us, the results remain 
virtually unchanged: sponsored loans still include more covenants (3.64) than non-sponsored 
loans (2.78) when controlling for financial risk. This result is robust to several alternative 
benchmark samples. The second and remaining explanation is that sponsored loans contain 
more covenants but they may be less restrictive. We try to examine this conjecture by 
investigating covenant thresholds, the restrictiveness proxy available for the benchmark 
sample. We observe that the covenant thresholds are mechanically driven by financial risk. 
Hence, thresholds represent only a precise restrictiveness measure when they are set in 
relation to the expected financial ratio. This is methodologically challenging as stated by 6 
 
Ivashina and Kovner (2010).
3 Hence, we are not able to substantiate our remaining 
explanation formally.  
In order to answer our second question, i.e. how restrictive are covenants in LBOs and 
what are the effects of information asymmetry costs and financial risk, we investigate 
covenant restrictiveness in sponsored loans in terms of the D/EBITDA covenant headroom. 
The headroom represents the negotiated percentage deviation between the lead arranging bank 
and the private equity investor that the limited financial ratio is allowed to deteriorate from 
the agreed forecast before covenant breach. 
Controlling for borrower, transaction, time and macroeconomic effects, we find evidence 
for both the reduced information asymmetry costs argument (Ivashina and Kovner, 2010) and 
the increased financial risk argument: an increase in assets under management (as proxy for 
the reduced information asymmetry costs) of €1 billion or one standard deviation results in a 
significantly higher D/EBITDA covenant headroom of 30 basis points or 128 basis points, 
respectively (at a mean of 23.2 percent headroom). An increase in the D/EBITDA multiple (as 
proxy for the increased financial risk argument) by 1x or one standard deviation reduces the 
D/EBITDA covenant headroom by 70 basis points or 134 basis points, respectively. Hence, 
the tightening of financial covenants due to increasing financial risk is mitigated through the 
PE sponsors’ reduction of information asymmetry costs. 
These results are robust to numerous checks: (1) We show that leverage both from a 
practical and econometrical point of view is not endogenous to covenant restrictiveness. (2) 
We prove that alternative financial risk and information asymmetry costs proxies lead to 
comparable results. (3) We control for different EBITDA definitions between deals which 
could introduce measurement errors in the cross-sectional analyses of EBITDA-based 
covenants.  
                                                 
3 For further details, please see section 3.2.1. 7 
 
These findings contribute to both the LBO literature and the covenant literature. 
Covenants as non-price credit terms have received very little attention in the LBO literature 
until now due to the limited availability and quality of data. Only recently, two notable 
contributions have helped to shed light on these essential components of the debt package. 
Ivashina and Kovner (2010) examine the effect of private equity investors’ bank relationships 
on the credit terms for their portfolio companies. They proxy for covenant restrictiveness with 
an indirect slack measure
4 and document, amongst other things, that stronger banking 
relationships lead to looser D/EBITDA covenants. The authors indicate, however, that their 
results are constrained by the indirect slack measure and the relatively limited covenant 
information disclosed in DealScan.
5 In a related paper, Demiroglu and James (2010a) focus 
on the effect of private equity investors’ reputation on the lending terms of private equity 
portfolio companies. They investigate the covenant structure with a simple count measure of 
restricted financial ratios and do not find that higher reputation leads to fewer covenants. 
Their results are, however, limited to the representativeness of the number of covenants as a 
measure for restrictiveness.
6 As pointed out by Ivashina and Kovner (2010), more covenants 
might not necessarily be more restrictive when covenants are customized for borrowers. Also, 
different types of covenants are likely to be not equally valuable to lenders.  
We contribute to these valuable insights on covenants in LBOs in the following ways: (1) 
we provide a detailed picture of the financial covenant menu in terms of types and 
combinations relative to a benchmark of non-sponsored loans, (2) we provide a detailed 
insight into the institutional covenant setting process and calculate precise covenant 
                                                 
4  For details, please see section 3.2.1. 
5   DealScan reports for 29% of their sponsored loan sample D/EBITDA covenant information while the 
DealScan population with available covenant information suggests that D/EBITDA covenants are included in 
82% of sponsored loans (Ivashina and Kovner, 2010). 
6  Furthermore, their results are based on a sample of public-to-private transactions. Strömberg (2008) shows 
that public-to-private deals between 2001 and 2007 account for only 6.7% (28%) of the private equity market 
in terms of transactions numbers (values). Chung (2009) suggests that public-to-private deals are 
fundamentally different from private-to-private deals. He documents that the former are motivated by the 
reduction of agency free cash flow problems (overinvestment) while the latter serve to alleviate investment 
constraints (growth). 8 
 
restrictiveness measures based on the proprietary data
7, (3) we complement the results of 
Ivashina and Kovner (2010) and Demiroglu and James (2010a) for the reduced information 
asymmetry costs argument by opposing it to the competing increased financial risk argument.  
This paper is also related to Axelson et al. (2010) and Kaplan and Stein (1993) who show 
that (1) the amount, repayment schedules and tranche partitions of debt and (2) buyout pricing 
are driven by marketwide conditions of debt. These results suggest that the availability of debt 
financing contributes to boom and bust cycles in buyout markets. Our study contributes to 
their work by investigating covenants as a further central credit term. This is particularly 
interesting since covenants – at least from a theoretical point of view – may be used to 
balance the pro-cyclical developments in the credit terms documented by Axelson et al. 
(2010). 
Our research also contributes to the still limited general literature on financial covenants 
(Chava and Roberts, 2008; Roberts and Sufi, 2009; amongst others). The contribution is to 
present more precise restrictiveness estimates not distorted by common accounting problems 
on the background of an appealing setting: LBOs concentrate ownership and control creating 
an interesting setting for capital structure decisions which are less distorted by agency 
conflicts between managers and owners. Further, the negotiations about significant debt 
amounts in LBOs without already existing debtholder structures and their associated claims 
provides a clear view on the influence of shareholders and debtholders on covenants. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the construction 
of both the LBO and benchmark sample. Section 3 contains the analyses of financial 
covenants. In a first step, we describe the covenant menu of sponsored loans and benchmark it 
against non-sponsored loans (section 3.1). In a second step, we provide an in-depth 
                                                 
7  We were able to receive the credit documentation and the financial forecasts for the portfolio companies. 
These proprietary data pieces enable us to circumvent conventional problems in measuring covenants 
restrictiveness as encountered in previous studies. For details, please see section 3.2.1. 9 
 
examination of the covenant restrictiveness of sponsored loans based on our proprietary data 
(section 3.2). Finally, section 4 concludes.  
2.  Data 
2.1  LBO SAMPLE 
We collected the proprietary LBO sample from the leveraged finance departments of 
three major European commercial banks. The query included all completed transactions for 
which these banks functioned as lead arrangers or co-lead arrangers, i.e. they were responsible 
for structuring the credit terms and conditions. Loan data was omitted when the bank did not 
finance the deal in the end, either because the private equity group (PEG) finally chose 
another bank or the PEG did not complete the LBO. At all three banks, we were granted 
access to the following proprietary documents:
8 the complete underwritten senior and 
subordinated loan contracts (text file), the original syndication memorandum (text file) and 
the underlying financial models (Excel file). Deals were excluded when the documents 
appeared to be inconsistent
9 (eight deals). The provided documents were the relevant 
documents at transaction date, i.e. the day of closing of the transaction. Potential post-closing 
amendments were not taken into consideration to maintain consistency between the provided 
documents and to reflect the ex-ante expectation of the banks at origination date.  
The documents were screened for all relevant data including sources and uses of the 
transaction financing, historical (t = -3 to t = -1), actual
10 (t = 0), and projected financial 
statements (t = 1 to t = 5), ownership structures, financial and non-financial covenants.  
                                                 
8  Disclosure rules in Germany are similar to disclosure rules in the US. Unless there are public securities 
outstanding financial reports do not have to be filed. The disclosure of loan contracts is optional. LBO loan 
information, in particular financial covenants, is typically kept private. 
9  For example, there were credit documents which had different covenant thresholds compared to the financial 
models. 
10  Underlying financial information at deal date is validated by auditors. 10 
 
In total we screened the credit documentation of 134 highly leveraged transactions in 
Germany from 2000 to 2008. Of these transactions, 130 were sponsored by 66 private equity 
groups, 4 were corporate takeovers and therefore omitted from the final sample. Similar to 
Kaplan and Ruback (1995) we included 21 leveraged recapitalizations as they are identical to 
LBOs except that this type of transaction does not include the repurchase of the entire 
company’s stock. Additionally, conversations with bankers reveal that they do not perceive 
any difference in terms of deal structuring between PE-sponsored LBOs and 
recapitalizations.
11 
The sample is based on data from three banks, therefore it is not a random sample and it 
is important to discuss potential selection issues. We were granted access to the banks highly 
confidential credit documentation due to prior research relationships. The banks did not filter 
their loans for our analysis. This is supported by the fact that several loans in the dataset were 
in default during the data aggregation. Deals that the bank did not finance in the end and/or 
the private equity sponsor lost the auction were omitted from the sample. As deals are often 
arranged by more than one bank, the sample includes deals from 23 different lead arranging 
banks and on average an LBO was arranged by 1.96 lead arrangers. The LBOs in our sample 
were sponsored by 66 different private equity groups, which represent 39% of all private 
equity members
12 of the German PE and VC association (BVK e.V.). We also observed seven 
deals where the private equity sponsor was bank-affiliated, e.g. Goldman Sachs Capital 
Partners (Principal Investment Area) is affiliated to Goldman Sachs & Co. We had only three 
deals where the deal was sponsored by a PEG that is affiliated to the lead arranging bank.
13 
Panel A of Table I shows that our transactions (excluding recapitalizations) represent 
more than 40 percent of the total LBO transaction volume of the German buyout market 
                                                 
11  Controlling for recapitalizations in our cross-sectional analysis does not change our reported results. 
12  Excluding sole VC members. 
13 Our results are unaffected by the in- or exclusion of these deals. 11 
 
between 2000 and 2008.
14 Compared to the Western European market, the world’s single 
largest private equity market, the sample covers about 6.7 percent of the CMBOR data and 
approx. 5.8 percent of the sample aggregated by Strömberg (2008) in the same period. 
Panel B benchmarks the distribution of deal types in our sample with those of the global, 
Western European, and German private equity market in the covered period between 2000 
and 2008.
15 While much of the existing literature focuses on public-to-private transactions, 
the low share in the sample (1.8% in terms of deal numbers) is representative for Western 
European (2.4%) and German (1.5%) private equity activity. However, our share is lower 
when compared to the global sample (6.8%) of Strömberg (2008).
16 The majority of deals in 
the sample consists of divisional buyouts (35.8%) and private-to-private buyouts (34.9%). 
Though the individual shares of these two private buyout types deviate from the various 
benchmark samples, the aggregate share (70.7%) is in line with the benchmarks (73.2% 
Global, 84.2% Western Europe, 71.8% Germany). We oversample secondary transactions in 
the study (26.6%) in comparison to the benchmarks (16.8% Global, 14.8% Western Europe, 
13.2% Germany). 
[Insert Table I here] 
Table II presents statistics on the size, pricing and capital structure of the transactions. 
The sample contains large deals: The median LBO enterprise value (EV) is €230.5 million 
compared to the median €42.4 million reported in Capital IQ.
17 The median deal is priced at 
an EV to EBITDA multiple of 6.9. Clearly, the majority of the buyout price is financed with 
debt: the median deal shows a D/EBITDA multiple of 4.3 and the equity contribution amounts 
                                                 
14   Transactions smaller than €10 million are omitted from the market volume. Transactions with an enterprise 
value of less than €10 million are mostly financed by government-backed banks and not financed by 
syndicated loans.  
15 The Strömberg (2008) sample is only available from 2001 to 2007. 
16 The difference is that in Germany there are (1) less publicly listed companies and (2) regulatory hurdles, e.g. 
there has been no formal implementation of a squeeze out rule before 2002/2006 (in 2002, the 
‘aktienrechtliche Squeeze-out’ had been introduced while in 2006, the ‘übernahmerechtliche Squeeze-out’ had 
been introduced. 
17 As reported by Strömberg (2008). We convert the 2007 US dollar values with the yearly average exchange 
rate of 1.36775.  12 
 
to 33.5%. Across time, we observe the typical boom and bust pattern although the trends are 
not always statistically significant. Debt (equity) levels increase (decrease) during the boom 
time 2004-2007 while they decrease (increase) with the financial crises in 2008. Overall, these 
pricing and capital structure statistics are broadly in line with recent work by Axelson et al. 
(2010).
18 
[Insert Table II here] 
Given the rich nature of the proprietary data, we can also provide a detailed picture of the 
financing terms of the debt package. Debt in buyouts includes senior and subordinated 
financing for which separate credit agreements regulate the claims of the lenders against the 
borrower.
19 Covenants, as the primary unit of analysis, are commonly more restrictive in 
senior credit agreements in order that senior lenders are enabled to receive control rights in 
advance of subordinated claims. Hence, the covenant analysis in section 3 will be based on 
the senior debt package. Consequently, we will focus the discussion of spreads and maturities 
on the senior part of debt.
20 Table III details the spreads and maturities.  
[Insert Table III here] 
We document that spreads and maturities are remarkably homogenous for all senior debt 
tranches. In the cross section, 65% (93%) of the deals have a Term A spread of 2.25% 
(between 2.0 and 2.5%) and 82% have a Term A maturity of 84 months. Over time, the 
median Term A spread varies in a statistical sense over the three observation periods
21, but the 
respective median values of 2.25, 2.25 and 2.5 highlight the fact that the changes are small in 
                                                 
18 Axelson, et al. (2010) report a median EV/EBTIDA of 7.6, D/EBITDA of 5.2x and D/EV of 70% for 1142 
worldwide LBOs. Although being reasonably close to our sample, when conditioning their sample on (1) our 
Western Europe setting and (2) our proprietary focus one private-to-private and divisional transactions (i.e. 
deals which are usually undersampled in commercial databases due to their invisibility), their pricing and 
capital structure statistics are almost identical.  
19 Senior debt includes A, B, C term loans, a revolving credit facility and a capex facility (Kaplan and Stein, 
1993). Revolving credit facility and capex facility have the same terms as Term A loans and are therefore not 
included in the Table. Subordinated debt comprehends second lien notes and mezzanine financing. 
20 The spreads for the subordinated tranches show more variation than the senior tranches. The maturities for the 
subordinated tranches remain highly standardized. 
21 The observation periods are 2000-2003, 2004-2007 and 2008, respectively.  13 
 
economic terms. Similarly, the respective median Term A maturity is in economic terms fairly 
stable over time. These patterns hold for all senior debt tranches and confirm Kaplan and 
Stein’s (1993) results for the first buyout wave as well as recent anecdotal evidence by S&P 
(2010).
22 The high uniformity in pricing is remarkable. If we assume a set of companies with 
the same financial but different total risk (e.g. due to industry-specific cash flow dynamics), 
one would expect lenders to charge these different companies different loan prices (Kaplan 
and Stein, 1993). There are several possible explanations for this. For instance, banks reduce 
the amount of debt they hold in their own books and pass on a larger share to other banks and 
institutional investors). Another explanation for the relatively small variation in loan prices 
are ‘non-price terms of credit’ which may be used by lenders to adjust their risk-return payoff. 
Our unit of analysis – covenants – represents one (if not the) central class of such non-price 
credit terms.  
2.2  BENCHMARK SAMPLE 
In order to evaluate the covenant menu of sponsored loans, we construct benchmark 
samples of non-sponsored loans from Reuters’ LPC DealScan database (DealScan). DealScan 
reports comprehensive information on syndicated loan deals, including the set of covenants 
and their respective thresholds. Each loan deal usually consists of several facilities, for 
example a term loan and a 364-revolving credit line. While certain credit characteristics, such 
as interest spreads, are set at the individual facility level, covenants are determined at the loan 
deal level (e.g. Bradley and Roberts, 2004; Demerjian, 2010). Hence, the analysis focuses at 
the deal level.
23  
We aim to construct benchmarks which mirror the loan deal characteristics (i.e. the type 
of loan facilities and the loan purpose) of the sponsored loan packages closely. Therefore, we 
                                                 
22 For details see Polenberg, et al. (2010). 
23 We consolidate facility-specific credit characteristics, such as interest spreads, to the deal level by weighting 
them with the facility size.  14 
 
construct two benchmark samples. The primary sample consists of all non-sponsored loan 
packages which include term loan facilities since these facilities provide the majority of debt 
financing in buyouts (Axelson et al., 2010). In addition to this primary sample, we construct 
an alternative benchmark sample which includes exclusively non-sponsored loan deals 
(including term loans) for the purpose of corporate acquisitions (Ivashina and Kovner, 2010). 
We include deals with covenant information from Dealscan during the period of 2000 to 
2008. Since we aim to control for financial risk, we condition both samples on the availability 
of Compustat data for the borrower.
24 This results in 1423 deal observations for the term loan 
sample and 795 observations for the acquisition sample. We select the term loan sample as the 
primary benchmark since it contains more observations for the analysis. The results are, 
however, stable across both benchmark samples.
25  
3.  Analysis of financial covenants 
The central objective of this paper is to understand covenants in LBO contracts. In 
section 3.1, we describe the covenant menu of sponsored loans and benchmark it against non-
sponsored loans. In section 3.2, we provide an in-depth examination of the covenant 
restrictiveness of sponsored loans based on proprietary information. 
3.1  THE MENU OF FINANCIAL COVENANTS 
Financial covenants constitute limits on the level of accounting figures expressed in both, 
relative and absolute value (e.g. Bradley and Roberts, 2004; Tirole, 2006). In transactions 
with senior and subordinated financing, there are two credit agreements which regulate the 
claims of the lenders against the borrower and an intercreditor agreement that regulates the 
claims between senior and subordinated lenders. While both the senior and the subordinated 
                                                 
24 In particular, we match our borrowers to Compustat via both the company names and tickers provided by 
DealScan.  
25 The results for the acquisition sample can be found in the appendix. 15 
 
credit agreement include separate financial covenants, senior debt covenants are commonly 
more restrictive in order to enable senior lenders to receive control rights in advance of 
subordinated claims. Financial covenant restrictiveness – in contrast to the mere inclusion of 
covenants – is typically not standardized and is subject to negotiation between borrowers and 
intermediaries or lenders. 
Financial covenants can be classified into two mutually exclusive fundamental 
categories: incurrence and maintenance financial covenants. The former category of 
covenants is tested only in case the borrower takes, or attempts to take, certain ex-ante defined 
actions which might extract wealth from debtholders such as dividend payments or the 
issuance of additional debt. This type of financial covenants restricts the actions of borrowers 
if certain accounting-based thresholds are not satisfied. By contrast, maintenance covenants 
have to be met on an ongoing basis over the term of the loan, independent of any explicit 
wealth-shifting attempts of the borrower. Generally, lenders perceive maintenance covenants 
as wealth-increasing in comparison to incurrence covenants as they are assumed to yield 
generally higher recovery rates in case of payment default.
26 Leveraged loans traditionally 
incorporate maintenance financial covenants. However, in overheated credit markets 
leveraged loans might incorporate incurrence covenants instead of maintenance covenants. 
Such a structure which includes incurrence covenants only is generally known as a ‘covenant-
lite’ deal in leveraged buyouts.
27 
Table IV focuses on the inclusion of separate covenants in sponsored loans and the 
respective benchmark of non-sponsored loans.  
[Insert Table IV here] 
                                                 
26 S&P estimates that loans with maintenance covenants have 8 percent to 14 percent higher recovery rates (see 
Lai and Bavaria, 2007).  
27 Our sample includes only one covenant-lite deal. This is representative of the Western European market where 
the first covenant-lite deal was originated in March 2007 for the refinancing of VNU World Directories by 
Cinven and Apax Partners. See http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/09-04-2007/covenant-lite-loans-appear-
on-european-buyout-stage.   16 
 
Following previous research (Chava and Roberts, 2008; Demerjian, 2010), the 
classification scheme by DealScan and discussions with industry experts, we consider the 
following set of seven financial covenants in the analysis: (1) Debt to EBITDA (D/EBITDA), 
(2) EBITDA to Interest (EBITDA/I), (3) Unlevered Cash Flow to Debt Service (CashFlow-
Coverage), (4) Capex, (5) Net Worth, (6) Debt to Equity (D/E) and (7) Current Ratio 
covenants. We document that sponsored loans focus on the first four of these seven 
covenants, i.e. D/EBITDA
28, EBITDA/I, CashFlowCoverage and Capex restrictions. These 
covenants are included in almost all sponsored loan agreements (97%, 80%, 97% and 74%) 
but to a significantly lower degree in non-sponsored loan agreements (71%, 46%, 56% and 
40%). Indeed, sponsored loans include no further covenant types whereas some non-
sponsored loans include Net Worth (29%), D/E (15%) and Current Ratio (5%) covenants. The 
differences in the inclusion frequencies between the sponsored and non-sponsored sample are 
statistically significant for all seven covenant types (at the 1% level except for the Current 
Ratio covenant). As Panel B suggests, these patterns seem to be relatively stable across 
different economic time periods.  
Besides the use of individual financial covenants, it is interesting to note how they are 
used in interaction. Table V documents the probabilities of encountering a specific covenant 
conditional on the existence of another covenant. Panel A focuses on the sponsored loans and 
Panel B reports the non-sponsored benchmark.  
[Insert Table V here] 
As expected, the conditional probabilities in the sponsored sample (Panel A) are high 
between all four premier covenants (D/EBITDA, EBITDA/I, CashFlowCoverage and Capex 
covenants) while they are zero if any of the three remaining covenants (D/E, Current Ratio 
and Net Worth) are considered. In the non-sponsored sample (Panel B), the conditional 
                                                 
28 We include Senior D/EBITDA in the D/EBITDA category of covenants. 17 
 
probabilities are more evenly distributed between all seven covenants. This pattern indicates 
that there is less variation in the set of covenant combinations for the sponsored than for the 
non-sponsored sample. Table VI examines this notion in greater detail by investigating the 
frequencies of the premier covenant combinations for both samples: The most frequent 
combination in sponsored loans, which contains D/EBITDA, EBITDA/I, cash flow coverage, 
and capex covenants, is found in 68% of the sponsored sample. In contrast, the most frequent 
combination in non-sponsored loans, which comprehends D/EBITDA and EBITDA/I 
covenants, is encountered in only 13% of the sponsored sample.
29 Hence, the covenant 
structure in terms of covenant combinations is more standardized in sponsored than in non-
sponsored loans.  
[Insert Table VI here] 
The aforementioned statistics for the individual covenants from Table IV translate into 
the observation that sponsored loans restrict more financial ratios than non-sponsored loans. 
On average, sponsored loan deals include 3.64 covenants, whereas their non-sponsored 
counterparts comprehend 2.81 covenants, the difference being statistically significant at the 
1% level. Having documented this difference, the natural question which arises is why?  
One obvious explanation is the increased financial risk argument: the underlying 
financial risk of the loans might be much higher for sponsored than for non-sponsored loans 
leading to a more restrictive covenant package. To test this explanation we try to control for 
differences in the D/EV and D/EBITDA levels of sponsored versus non-sponsored loans. 
Hence, we collect financials for the non-sponsored loan sample from Compustat for the 
financial year following the loan issuance. Indeed, looking at D/EBITDA and D/EV in Panel 
C of Table IV reveals that the borrowers of sponsored loans have significantly higher leverage 
                                                 
29 Similarly, if we extend our analysis to the top three covenant combinations, we observe that one of these 
premier combinations is present in 90% of the sponsored sample while we find that one of these combinations 
is inherent in only 32% of the non-sponsored sample. 18 
 
levels than non-sponsored borrowers. There are two interesting questions: (i) are there non-
sponsored loans with comparable leverage levels, and if there are comparable loans (ii) how 
does their covenant structure compare to sponsored loans. As a simple test we sort the 
benchmark sample according to D/EV (or D/EBITDA which yields identical results) and look 
at the characteristics of the quartile of loans with the highest financial risk. We find that this 
highest leverage quartile of non-sponsored loans exhibits comparable financial risk 
(D/EV=68% and D/EBITDA=5.64) to the sponsored loan sample, the difference being 
statistically insignificant (p-value 0.30 and 0.35 respectively).
30 This seems particularly 
puzzling as the information asymmetry costs argument would suggest that sponsored loans 
would receive a looser covenant setting when financial risk is similar to non-sponsored loans. 
The findings may be inaccurate if our benchmark is not appropriate. In order to 
investigate this possibility, we (i) conduct the same procedure with loans used for acquisition 
purposes, (ii) we build industry-year-leverage matches for both the term loan and acquisition 
samples.
31 We notice that the results remain virtually the same across all samples (see 
appendix for the acquisition sample results; the industry-year-leverage matched benchmarks 
are available upon request). This strengthens our belief that the results are not systematically 
biased by the benchmarking choice.     
Another intuitive explanation for our findings is that sponsored loans contain more 
covenants but they may be less restrictive. We try to shed light on this issue by investigating 
the covenant thresholds, the proxy of restrictiveness available for our benchmark sample. 
                                                 
30 We are confident that our non-sponsored borrowers are not in distress as syndicated loans are typically not 
provided to distressed companies. Table AIII in the appendix compares borrower and loan characteristics for 
our sponsored and non-sponsored sample. 
31 With respect to the financial risk of our borrowers, we match our sponsored loans to non-sponsored loans 
according to year, industry and leverage. In particular, we identify all companies that have originated a 
syndicated loan in the same year as the LBO target company. We then retain those companies that operate in 
the same two-digit SIC industry. In case there are fewer than 5 potential matched firms, we base ourselves on 
the one-digit SIC code. The peer firm is then the firm whose financial risk measure is closest to that of the 
LBO target company. 19 
 
Table VII reports the results for the sponsored as well as the non-sponsored loans. Non-
sponsored loans are divided into quartiles according to their financial risk (D/EV).
32   
[Insert Table VII here] 
In the following we focus on the comparison of covenant thresholds between the 
sponsored loans and the fourth quartile of non-sponsored loans with the highest financial risk 
(in the following called ‘fourth quartile’).
33 We find a mixed picture across the three main 
covenants. The threshold of the D/EBITDA covenant is almost identical in sponsored (5.02) 
and fourth quartile (5.30) loans, the difference being statistically insignificant (p-value of 
0.11). The thresholds for the EBITDA/I and CashFlowCoverage covenant are different 
between sponsored and non-sponsored loans (both with a p-value < 0.01), however in 
opposite directions. While the mean sponsored loan has a 0.75 (27%) higher EBITDA/I 
threshold, it actually has a 0.25 (24%) lower CashFlowCoverage threshold compared to the 
mean non-sponsored loan. Again, we investigate whether these results may be subject to a 
selection bias in our benchmark sample. We calculate the thresholds for all alternative 
benchmark samples but the findings remain the same.  
What seems a likely explanation is that thresholds as absolute values of financial ratios 
may not represent a direct measure of covenant restrictiveness as already indicated by 
Ivashina and Kovner (2010). Indeed, our data supports this notion: in all four benchmark 
quartiles, the thresholds (D/EBITDA, EBITDA/I and CashFlowCoverage) vary monotonically 
across the quartile subsamples (Table VII). For example, we observe that the D/EBITDA 
threshold grows monotonically with increasing leverage levels (from 3.39 in the first quartile 
to 5.30 in the fourth quartile). These results suggest that thresholds are directly driven by the 
                                                 
32 Sorting the sample according to D/EBITDA leads to virtually identical results. 
33 Our D/EBITDA financial risk variable is larger than the covenant thresholds, both for sponsored and non- 
sponsored loans. This would indicate that the average loan is in covenant breach. However, covenants are 
typically tested for the first time twelve months after loan inception. During this period the borrower is 
expected to reduce the outstanding debt and typically increase EBITDA, leading to an expected financial ratio 
that is considerably below the covenant threshold.  20 
 
underlying financial risk of the borrower and do not represent a direct measure of covenant 
restrictiveness.  
Hence, we are not able to formally test the conjecture that sponsored loans may include 
more but less restrictive covenants than non-sponsored loans. However, the rich nature of our 
proprietary LBO dataset will allow us in the next section to provide an in-depth examination 
of the covenant restrictiveness for sponsored loans. We will be able to precisely determine the 
magnitude of covenant restrictiveness and thereby to test our competing arguments of the 
impact of information asymmetry costs and financial risk on covenant restrictiveness.  
3.2  FINANCIAL COVENANT RESTRICTIVENESS 
3.2.1  Understanding Financial Covenant Restrictiveness 
In the previous section, we have shown that thresholds seem to be linked to the level of 
financial risk. For instance, we have noticed that D/EBITDA thresholds increased with 
underlying leverage levels. This observation underlines the concern that thresholds as an 
absolute metric may not be a sharp measure of covenant restrictiveness. Using thresholds as a 
measure of covenant restrictiveness does not indicate how close the threshold is set to the 
expected ratio, i.e. how in danger the company is to violating the covenant. For instance, firm 
A might have a D/EBITDA threshold of 6/1 with a current D/EBITDA ratio of 4/1, while firm 
B has a D/EBITDA threshold of 7/1 and a current D/EBITDA ratio of 6.5/1. Evidently, firm B 
is more in danger of violating a covenant, i.e. has a more restrictive D/EBITDA covenant, all 
else being equal. In order to address this concern, studies usually follow an indirect approach 
and control for all relevant financial risk variables at the right-hand side in a multivariate 
framework. 
Alternatively studies directly calculate the covenant slack (i.e. the distance to default) as 
a measure of covenant tightness. The covenant slack is defined as the difference between the 21 
 
covenant threshold and the expected future ratio at a defined point in time. The greater the 
slack the looser the covenant since the borrower’s financial ratio can deteriorate by a larger 
amount before triggering a covenant violation. Since information on the expected 
performance of the borrower is hard to obtain, researchers generally calculate the actual slack. 
For instance, Dichev and Skinner (2002) calculate the difference between the covenant 
threshold and the actual reported ratio. Therefore, the actual slack is the result of two factors, 
i.e. the ex ante set covenant tightness and the ex post realized performance of the borrower. In 
our example, firm A would have a slack of 2/1 (6/1-4/1) and firm B of 0.5/1 suggesting that 
firm B has a more restrictive D/EBITDA covenant. But we would not know whether this tight 
covenant is the result of a poor performance of firm B or a tight covenant setting at loan 
origination, or both. A further concern with the actual slack as a measure for restrictiveness is 
that the definition of the input variables for the covenant and the actual realized ratio may 
vary. To minimize these inaccuracies, most studies that calculate the actual slack use net 
worth and current ratio covenants that have relatively few adjustments (see Dichev and 
Skinner, 2002). However, net worth and current ratio covenants are rarely used in LBOs. 
Given the nature of our dataset, we are able to address these concerns by calculating the slack 
as the difference between the D/EBITDA covenant threshold and the expected future 
D/EBITDA at the first testing date.
34 Still, the slack is not a perfect apples-to-apples measure 
of covenant tightness in the cross-section. Comparing D/EBITDA slack across different deals 
might introduce measurement errors since the definition of the input parameters (i.e. debt and 
EBITDA) may vary across deals (Lawler, 2007). 
Besides the covenant threshold and slack, it is interesting to revisit the process of how 
financial covenant thresholds – which are documented in the credit agreement (see Figure I) – 
are determined. In the beginning the private equity group identifies a target company, which it 
                                                 
34 The testing date is the point in time when financial ratios are calculated and compared to the financial 
covenant threshold in the credit agreement. 22 
 
plans to bid on and therefore sends a business plan to potential lead arranging banks. Based on 
the provided information, lead arrangers decide on whether to submit a term sheet to the 
sponsor. The term sheet typically includes rough estimates of the debt package including 
interest margins, debt package, maturity as well as types of financial covenants. In the case 
where the sponsor agrees to the term sheet, the sponsor sends his detailed operational model 
(‘sponsor case’), which includes the sponsor’s estimate for EBITDA and unlevered cash 
flow
35, to the lead arranging bank. Based on the provided operational information and its own 
due diligence, the lead arranger adjusts the sponsor’s case to his own assumed growth rates 
for EBITDA and unlevered free cash flow. Based on this forecast, the lead-arranging bank 
and the PEG negotiate a final debt package, including debt volume and instruments as well as 
repayment and interest schedules. The combination of the operational forecast and the debt 
package constitutes the ‘financing case’, which is disclosed to potential syndication partners. 
The financing case contains explicit quarterly forecasts typically covering the next five years 
for key financial variables such as debt, interest, repayments, as well as operational variables 
like EBITDA and unlevered cash flow. These forecasts constitute the basis for negotiating 
financial covenants.  
A numerical example of how financial covenant thresholds are calculated is shown in 
Figure II. It starts from the given financial forecast for debt and EBITDA, which are 
combined in the projected ratio of D/EBITDA (here 5.7x for Q2 2010). The PEG and the lead 
arranger then negotiate the so-called headroom, which is the percentage of the projected 
EBITDA that the borrower might deteriorate. In our example, the lead arranger expects the 
buyout company to achieve an EBITDA of €22.3m in Q2 2010. Applying a 25% headroom, 
the company is allowed to achieve a 25% lower EBITDA than originally projected, i.e. 
€16.7m or 75% of €22.3m. To arrive at the ratio in the credit agreement, the projected debt 
                                                 
35 Unlevered cash flow equals free cash flow before interest. It is identical to free cash flow for a 100% equity 
financed firm. 23 
 
level is divided by the allowed EBITDA, for Q2 2010 the covenant threshold is projected to 
be 7.6x. This procedure can also be constructed by applying the headroom to the forecasted 
ratio [5.7x/(1-0.25)]. However, in the practical world the headroom calculation on the 
EBITDA has prevailed because it is not ambiguous when comparing the headroom across 
different types of financial covenants. For instance, while one needs to divide the D/EBITDA 
ratio by one minus headroom, you need to multiply the EBITDA/I by one minus headroom to 
arrive at the same implied EBITDA level (see Figure III for a formalization of the headroom 
calculations for the different types of covenants).
36 One obvious question is why the credit 
agreement includes ratios and not minimum EBITDA levels? In the ex ante perspective debt 
is a given variable and EBITDA the performance of the borrower. In the ex post perspective, 
i.e. during the loan, the lender wants to monitor the risk of the outstanding loan – taking into 
account historical repayments – which is best captured by the D/EBITDA ratio rather than the 
EBITDA level.  
Practitioners view headroom as the single most influential factor determining the 
restrictiveness of financial covenants.
37 As a managing director of Bain Capital stated: 
‘… The tightness of financial covenants is one of the most essential items during loan 
negotiations. We would rather accept higher margins than reducing headrooms. 
Breaching covenants can lead to wiping out our equity position while higher margins 
only reduce our IRR …’ 
Comparing the slack to the headroom, it is straightforward to see that the slack is the 
result of the underlying leverage of the transaction and a multiplier which is determined by 
the headroom.  
                                                 
36 For our prior example of firm A and firm B, firm A would have a headroom of 33.3% [-(4/6-1)] and firm B a 
headroom of 7.1% [-(6.5/7-1)]. Therefore, firm A enjoys looser covenants as compared to firm B. 
37 The headroom is also one of the crucial items when selling LP stakes. In his analysis the potential buyer looks 
closely at the headrooms of the respective portfolio companies. If the headroom is very small, potential buyers 
typically do not attribute any value to the equity stake of the portfolio company.  24 
 
3.2.2  Univariate analysis of financial covenant restrictiveness 
Table VIII presents the thresholds and headrooms of the three main financial covenants 
in LBOs, namely D/EBITDA, EBITDA/I and CashFlowCoverage. We document the 
development of thresholds and headrooms over the first three years after the transaction (i.e. 
t=1 to t=3) for both the whole sample and subsamples of loans negotiated in different years. 
Panel A reports thresholds while Panel B reports headrooms. 
 [Insert Table VIII here] 
Panel A shows that D/EBITDA covenant thresholds typically decrease from t=1 to t=3, 
being mechanically driven by the reduction of debt and the expected increase of EBITDA 
(assuming constant headroom). In contrast to the D/EBITDA threshold, the EBITDA/I 
threshold increases over the planning horizon (t=1 to t=3). This observation is also 
mechanical, since interest payments stay fairly stable – as only the relatively lower spread 
Term A loan is redeemed – and EBITDA is mostly forecasted to grow (again assuming a 
constant headroom). The CashFlowCoverage threshold experiences very little variation from 
t=1 to t=3, it is predominantly set to 1.0. This seems striking, as financial covenants are 
presumably utilized to serve as a signal for the state of the firm so that lenders can intervene 
early to limit wealth reduction. However, if a CashFlowCoverage covenant of 1 is violated, 
the firm cannot satisfy its debt obligations from its ongoing cash flows.
38  
If we split our loan sample into the time periods 2000-2003 (pre credit boom), 2004-2007 
(credit boom) and 2008 (post credit boom), we observe the following trends. As expected, the 
D/EBITDA thresholds increase in the presumably overheated 2004-2007 period (significant at 
                                                 
38 Only if the existing cash level is sufficient to cover outstanding payments or if equity injections by sponsors 
are made, can the firm avoid payment default. However, banks should not expect borrowers to have any cash 
on hand or private equity sponsors to inject additional equity. Indeed, there have only been a few equity 
injections by private equity sponsors in the 2008/2009 period. Thus, assuming neither of the two 
aforementioned possibilities, this setting would not give the lender any time to intervene before they would be 
confronted with default payments. Consequently, it seems that lenders may apply some specific logic to their 
financial covenant setting where the CashFlowCoverage covenant is used as a signal of last resort. 25 
 
the 5% level) while the EBITDA/I and CashFlowCoverage decrease (significant at the 1% 
level). In 2008, while the D/EBITDA (EBITDA/I) thresholds tend back towards lower 
(higher) levels, none of the trends is statistically significant. A potential reason for this result 
may be the relatively limited sample of 8 observations in the 2008 period.  
Panel B presents headrooms for the sample. In contrast to thresholds, headrooms are 
easier to interpret as they provide a direct view of the restrictiveness of financial covenants. 
We generally find that financial covenants are stricter in the early years of the planning 
horizon and are relaxed over time from t=1 to t=3. While all three financial covenants adhere 
to this schematic, the D/EBITDA covenant shows a faster relief (delta of medians t = 1 versus 
t = 3 equals (29.3 - 23.3) equals 6.0 percentage points) than the EBITDA/I (delta of medians t 
= 1 versus t = 3 equals 2.0 percentage points) and the CashFlowCoverage covenant (delta of 
medians t = 1 versus t = 3 equals 3.4 percentage points). This observation lends strong 
evidence to the financial risk argument since the forecasted headrooms present a quasi ceteris 
paribus setting: only the financial risk changes from t=1 to t=3 but everything else remains 
constant at the date of transaction. 
Interestingly, when we split our loan sample again into the 2000-2003 (pre credit boom), 
2004-2007 (credit boom) and 2008 (post credit boom) periods, we notice that the headrooms 
stay considerably stable across the different economic time periods. With the exception of the 
EBITDA/I headroom in t=3, there are no statistically significant trends across the periods. 
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3.2.3  Multivariate analysis of financial covenant restrictiveness 
3.2.3.1  Explanatory variables 
In order to test whether financial risk and/or information asymmetry costs impact the 
restrictiveness of financial covenants we construct several proxies for each of our two main 
determinants. Table IX Panel A provides descriptive statistics for these variables.  
[Insert Table IX here] 
Similar to Axelson et. al. (2010) we use two different measures for financial risk: net 
debt divided by earnings before interest and depreciation (D/EBITDA) and net debt divided 
by the enterprise value (D/EV). The leverage of the LBOs in our sample exhibit comparable 
leverage levels to previous studies.
39 The average LBO has a D/EBITDA multiple of 4.4x and 
finances 66% of the enterprise value with debt. Both leverage measures show considerable 
variation with a standard deviation of 1.5x for D/EBITDA and 9.6 percentage points for 
D/EV.   
In order to measure reduced information asymmetry costs we construct several variables. 
A prominent measure for reduced information asymmetry in the lending market is the size of 
the private equity group (PEG). We calculate the size of the PEG by aggregating the capital 
committed to the funds of the PEG over the last five years before the transaction, which 
mirrors the procedure applied by Private Equity International (PEG size). We obtained 
committed capital from fund data included in Thomson Venture Economics (TVE). The 
average PEG had €3 billion under management at the date of the deal. Due to the inclusion of 
very large PEGs such as, e.g. KKR, Bain Capital, Goldman Sachs Capital Partners, Carlyle, 
among others, the standard deviation is €5 billion. Another way to measure reduced 
                                                 
39 For example Axelson et. al. (2010) report a mean D/EBITDA of 5.6x and a mean D/EV of 69% for 1142 
LBOs. When conditioning their sample on (1) our Western Europe setting and (2) our proprietary focus on 
divisional and private-to-private transactions (i.e. deals which are usually undersampled in commercial 
databases due to their invisibility) their leverage statistics are likely to be highly similar to ours.  27 
 
information asymmetry costs has been proposed by Gompers and Lerner (1999). They argue 
that investors learn about the characteristics and behavior of private equity organizations over 
time. Therefore we use the lifetime of a PEG as another proxy for reduced information 
asymmetry costs (PEG lifetime). We aggregate the age of the private equity organization at 
transaction date by using the fund database of TVE. We then check the year of the first fund 
with available public information coming directly from the PEG. If the data from TVE and 
the public information do not match, we use the information provided directly from the PEG. 
The average PEG in the sample has a lifetime of 15.6 years with a standard deviation of 12.3 
years. As an additional measure for reduced information asymmetry costs we use the 
frequency of interactions with the syndicated loan market. Therefore, we count the number of 
transactions a PEG was able to complete before the respective deal in our sample (PEG 
number of deals). We collect all deals recorded in TVE and MergerMarket during three years 
prior to the transaction. The average deal in our sample was sponsored by a PEG which 
completed 17.4 deals before the respective transaction with a standard deviation of 17.3.  
Table IX Panel B presents the correlation matrix for our measures for information 
asymmetry costs. We find that the three measures are highly and significantly correlated. For 
reasons of brevity, we present our regressions estimated for PEG size. The alternative proxies 
lead to qualitatively similar results. 
Besides the aforementioned variables that primarily measure the repeated interaction 
with debt markets we also try to capture the reduction of information asymmetry costs caused 
by the degree of repeated interaction between individual banks and PEGs. Similar to Ivashina 
and Kovner (2010) and Bharath et al. (2007), we measure banking relationship by the value of 
loans in the previous five years underwritten by the lead arranging bank divided by the total 
value of all loans sponsored by the respective private equity group as reported in DealScan 
(Banking relationship). In case more than one bank functioned as lead arranger, the highest 28 
 
among these values is selected. The average Banking relationship is 23.2% with a standard 
deviation of 26.5% across LBO firms. However, we perceive that the banking relationship 
variables might be subject to a selection bias, as Dealscan exhibits lower coverage of 
European small cap deals, which results in a large number of a zero banking relationships 
(27%), which we know is actually incorrect for many deals observed in our dataset. 
Therefore, we do not include a separate variable for banking relationship in our regressions. 
In our analysis we do not differentiate between reduced information asymmetry costs based 
on repeated interaction with the lending market or the repeated interaction between specific 
banks and respective PEGs.  
In order to control for company characteristics we include profitability at transaction, size 
categories and expected EBITDA growth. To control for market conditions we include the 
credit spread between AAA and BB corporate debt during the month of the transaction. 
Furthermore, we test our results for year and industry fixed effects to eliminate time variations 
in market conditions.  
3.2.3.2  Results  
In Table X we examine the determinants of financial covenant restrictiveness in senior 
bank loan contracts of buyout firms using a sample of 130 buyouts.
40 Since the D/EBITDA 
covenant is the most important covenant in LBOs, the D/EBITDA covenant headroom is 
typically the heaviest negotiation item during the covenant setting process. In our analysis we 
use the most restrictive, i.e. smallest, headroom of the D/EBITDA covenant in the first two 
years after the transaction as the dependent variable.
41 We run ordinary least square 
regressions (OLS) and the coefficients represent the percentage point change of the headroom 
dependent on a change of the independent variable. As White- and Breusch-Pagan-tests 
                                                 
40 The final sample includes 126 observations for the D/EBITDA headroom. 
41 In the vast majority of the cases, the covenant headroom was tightest at the first testing date, i.e. one year after 
the transaction. 29 
 
indicate heteroskedasticity of the estimated residuals, we use heteroskedasticity-consistent 
(Huber-White) standard errors for estimating p-values.  
Further, the independent variables used for leverage,  profitability and growth,  raise 
concerns that the models suffer from multicollinearity. However, the variance inflation factors 
(VIF) of these variables are less than 1.28 in all models, suggesting that multicollinearity is 
not severe. 
[Insert Table X here] 
In regression (1), the baseline specification, we model the D/EBITDA headroom as a 
function of PEG size, leverage, profitability, expected EBITDA growth and credit risk spread. 
We find that PEG size significantly increases the D/EBITDA headroom. An increase of assets 
under management by €1 billion or one standard deviation (approx. €5 billion) results in a 
higher D/EBITDA covenant headroom of 30 basis points or 128 basis points, respectively (at 
a mean of 23.2 percent headroom and a standard deviation representing 6.6 percent points 
headroom).  
In line with theoretical and empirical literature, we show that leverage, i.e. more financial 
risk, leads to more restrictive financial covenants, i.e. lower headroom – being robust for both 
D/EBITDA and D/EV (see specification 2 for the latter). Leverage, however, might be an 
endogenous variable, as it not only affects financial covenant restrictiveness, but also vice 
versa, covenant restrictiveness might have an influence on leverage (Billett et al., 2007). 
While a detailed analysis of this potential problem is provided in Section 3.2.3.3. on 
robustness below, our results show that our models do not exhibit endogeneity, which is 
supported by characteristics regarding the process of financial covenant determination. 
Therefore, increasing the D/EBITDA multiple by 1x reduces the leverage headroom by 70 
basis points (a one standard deviation increase results in a 134 basis points reduction in 
headroom). 30 
 
Increased profitability, measured as EBITDA/sales
42 at transaction (t = 0), leads to 
significantly less restrictive covenants, i.e. higher D/EBITDA headroom. This finding 
suggests that lenders perceive past profitability as a signal that future behavior of management 
will be positive and therefore lenders grant more flexibility to management in terms of less 
restrictive financial covenants. An EBITDA margin, which is higher by one percentage point 
or one standard deviation, increases the leverage headroom by about 19 basis points or 187 
basis points, respectively.  
We also find strong evidence that financial covenants are less restrictive for higher 
growth firms, i.e. receive higher D/EBITDA headroom. Accordingly, increasing the expected 
EBITDA growth forecast over the first three years after the buyout by one percentage point or 
one standard deviation increases the D/EBITDA headroom by 28 basis points or 173 basis 
points, respectively. Substituting EBITDA growth by expected sales growth yields robust 
results. Whereas theory predicts different directions we find direct evidence that shareholders 
and management of high-growth firms value flexibility more than shareholders of comparable 
low-growth firms. At first, this finding appears to contradict the results of many scholars, e.g. 
Billett et al. (2007)
43, who suggest that higher growth firms receive more restrictive 
covenants. But most past studies evaluate covenant protection by the mere counting of action-
restricting covenants in the context of agency theory. Our research design allows us to draw 
direct conclusions regarding the potential shift of control rights, which are not in conflict with 
action-restricting covenants, but are complementary and might adhere to a different economic 
logic. Previous literature shows that high growth firms receive more action-restricting 
                                                 
42 In our view EBITDA/sales is a better proxy for profitability than EBITDA/assets because assets represent the 
purchase price at t = 0. Therefore, EBITDA/assets would be the reciprocal of the EBITDA multiple of the 
enterprise value and highly negatively correlated with leverage, leading to multicollinearity problems. 
However, including EBITDA/assets does not change the results and profitability remains highly significant in 
all models. 
43 Billett et al. (2007) find a significant relationship for the growth proxy market-to-book, although they did not 
find any significant relationship for their sales growth proxies. 31 
 
covenants; however, we show that they negotiate greater flexibility for their financial 
covenants. 
We do not find a statistically significant influence of macroeconomic conditions on 
covenant restrictiveness of leveraged loans. However, as intuition suggests the credit spread 
between AAA and BB bonds is negatively related to headroom. In other words, the more risk 
averse the credit suppliers, the more restrictive are financial covenants. 
Interestingly, model 3 shows that the size of the firm does not have a significant impact 
on financial covenant restrictiveness. One explanation might be that potential lenders in the 
credit market are more concerned with the reputation of the sponsor than with the target, 
implicitly transferring the sponsor-related reputation to the borrowing firm. Removing the 
size of the PEG does not alter the coefficients and t-values of the size variables. Anecdotal 
evidence supports this argument. Practitioners state that if KKR were to buy a significantly 
smaller than usual company they would still enjoy favorable credit terms. We could not test 
for this effect because there are very few deals where a small company was acquired by a high 
reputation PEG, and vice versa. 
3.2.3.3  Robustness 
To begin with, the pooled OLS regression shown in model 5 of Table X accounts for 
industry and time fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered by industry and deal year, a 
method also used by Axelson et al. (2010). It shows that our results are robust against the 
inclusion of such effects. 
Besides the outlined advantages of the headroom as a measure of covenant 
restrictiveness, the headroom might also be exposed to the same measurement error as slack 
and threshold in the cross-section due to varying definitions of D/EBITDA in LBOs. In order 32 
 
to address this potential issue, we test our results for robustness by including a measure for the 
restrictiveness of the EBITDA definition in the credit agreements.  
Being well aware of the low comparability of the definitions in loans, the Loan Market 
Association (LMA) tries to standardize definitions used to calculate financial covenants in 
credit agreements. As Mark Campbell, Head of Global Finance of Clifford Chance put it: ‘… 
LMA covenants [definitions] define exactly what EBITDA is for the purposes of the document 
… ‘.
44 While the final definitions in the individual credit agreements may differ from the 
LMA standard, LMA definitions are typically used as a starting point to negotiate the 
definitions of covenants. Over the course of the deal process, definitions are possibly 
customized, depending on the negotiation between lead arranger and sponsor.  
To control for the effect of definitions, we measure the deviation of the deal-specific 
EBITDA definition to the standardized LMA definition for EBITDA in leveraged loans. 
Specifically, we count the number of add-backs to net income to arrive at EBITDA. If the 
credit agreement contains less add-backs than the LMA standard the dummy variable Strict 
EBITDA Definition is set to 1. If the credit agreement contains more add-backs than the LMA 
standard the dummy variable Loose EBITDA Definition is set to 1.
45 
Further, many scholars suspect and find evidence for simultaneous causality between 
leverage and covenant restrictiveness (e.g. Bradley and Roberts, 2004; Billett et al., 2007). 
Their analysis, however, focuses on the mere existence of covenants and not on the inherent 
restrictiveness of financial covenants. Negotiations on leverage take place at the beginning of 
the loan arrangements (mostly at the proposal stage), while the restrictiveness of financial 
covenants (i.e. headroom) is negotiated during the final phase of the loan arrangement (for a 
                                                 
44 For the full article of Clifford Chance on financial covenants see (last visited on 30.05.2010):  
  http://www.cliffordchance.com/expertise/publications/details.aspx?FilterName=@URL&LangID=UK&conte
ntitemid=13406   
45 EBITDA being the most important item in financial covenant calculations is also a good proxy for other 
relevant covenant inputs, such as, e.g. debt. For a list of potential add-backs see Lawler (2007), p. 13.  33 
 
more detailed description see Ivashina and Kovner, (2010). Hence, we conceptually expect no 
problem of endogeneity, i.e. that the level of headroom has a causal effect on the level of 
leverage in our models of financial covenant restrictiveness. Nonetheless, in order to test for 
these effects we conducted Wu-Hausman tests. We used all-in-drawn spread as an instrument 
for the suspected endogenous leverage variable: like leverage, all-in-drawn spread, defined as 
the value-weighted sum of the spreads over EURIBOR of the utilized senior and subordinated 
tranches, is a parameter of the credit contract that is set at the beginning of the loan 
negotiations and should be exogenous to the financial covenant models for several reasons: 
First, the pricing of the different tranches in leveraged loans is mostly driven by credit 
markets and therefore experiences very low variations as also noted for buyouts in the 1980s 
by Kaplan and Stein (1993). Second, standardized spreads are characteristic for European 
credit markets, in contrast to spreads in the US which are negotiated to be more flexible as 
indicated by Demiroglu and James (2010a) and Ivashina and Kovner (2010). Finally, our 
interviews with lead arrangers and private equity sponsors support the assumption that there is 
no link between spreads and financial covenant restrictiveness. 
 Further, all-in-drawn spread as defined above, is a relevant variable, as leverage and all-
in-drawn spread are strongly correlated (correlation coefficient: 0.44). This relationship is 
mechanical as more expensive subordinated debt is used in more highly leveraged 
transactions (Axelson et al., 2010). Regressing leverage on all-in-drawn spread results in a 
highly significant coefficient (t-value of 5.36, i.e. a p-value of 0.00). The Wu-Hausman tests 
indicate no relevant endogeneity in the models, since the residuals on leverage from the 
reduced form regression have no significant impact on D/EBITDA headrooms in the initial 
structural form. 
An additional concern might be the adequateness of our measure for covenant 
restrictiveness. According to Dichev and Skinner (2002), borrowers might engage in 34 
 
accounting manipulation to avoid financial covenant violation. This behavior might reduce 
the effectiveness of financial covenants overall and thus the importance of their 
restrictiveness. However, several reasons argue against a substantial accounting manipulation 
in leveraged loans. First, lead arrangers have considerable experience in originating and 
monitoring loans, reducing the ability of borrowers to ‘consistently fool private lenders via 
accounting manipulation’ (Chava and Roberts, 2008). Second, building on the first argument, 
lead arrangers define financial covenants in great detail and the calculations are specified ex 
ante and implemented in the financial models.
46 Third, credit agreements constitute a ‘GAAP 
freeze’, which does not allow any changes in accounting principles. Fourth, the quarterly 
calculation of financial covenants during the lifetime of the loan has to be certified by auditors 
and the chief financial officer of the firm. Finally, evidence suggests that managers prefer to 
cut investments rather than manipulate accounts in order to prevent covenant violations 
(Graham et al., 2005; Chava and Roberts, 2008).
47 
4.  Conclusion 
Private equity investors are important providers of capital for companies. Still, we know 
relatively little about the detailed financial structure of LBOs (Axelson et al., 2010). We are 
the first to provide a detailed view on financial covenants in LBOs. From a theoretical point 
of view, it is not clear whether the covenant setting in private equity sponsored loans should 
be different in comparison to traditional non-sponsored loans and, in particular, whether it 
should be more or less restrictive: On the one hand, more frequent and larger in scale 
interactions of private equity investors with the lending market should reduce information 
asymmetry costs which in turn leads to less restrictive covenant structures for sponsored 
                                                 
46 For definition guidelines, see the loan market association. In practice, definitions are individually negotiated 
and can become quite complex.  
47 While cutting investment does not improve financial covenants directly, the cash preserved by not undertaking 
investments is considered in the net debt calculation.(Net debt = Debt – Cash). 35 
 
loans. On the other hand, however, higher financial risk due to increased leverage levels of 
LBOs should lead to more restrictive covenant structures for sponsored loans. Hence, it is an 
empirical matter. 
We first present evidence that the covenant structure in terms of types and combinations 
is more standardized in sponsored loans than in non-sponsored ones. Our sponsored loan 
sample includes only four specific covenant types while the non-sponsored sample contains 
seven. The most frequent covenant combination for sponsored loans is found in 68% of their 
cases while the respective premier covenant combination of non-sponsored loans is only 
encountered in 13% of their sample. Furthermore, sponsored loans restrict more financial 
ratios (3.64) than non-sponsored loans (2.81). We show that this result is not caused by the 
higher financial risk of sponsored than non-sponsored borrowers. What seems a more likely 
explanation is that sponsored loans include more but less restrictive covenants than non-
sponsored borrowers.  
In a second step, we take a detailed look at covenant restrictiveness. By measuring 
restrictiveness precisely with the D/EBITDA covenant headroom, i.e. calculating the distance 
between covenant thresholds and financial forecasts, we document that our two competing 
arguments both have economically large effects: an increase in PEG’s assets under 
management as proxy for reduced information asymmetry costs, by one standard deviation 
decreases the D/EBITDA covenant headroom by 128 basis points (at a mean of 23.2%). An 
increase in the debt to EBITDA multiple as proxy for the increased financial risk argument, 
by one standard deviation increases the D/EBITDA covenant headroom by 134 basis points.  
Taking into account that financial covenants regained high significance as control 
mechanisms in LBOs after the recent credit crunch, future research seems worthwhile. An 
interesting and important research question, which has not been examined sufficiently, is the 
impact of financial covenants on the probability of (payment) default and loss-given default, 36 
 
similar to Zhang (2009) for corporate debt. A related question is how private equity groups 
react to defaults and what impacts their behavior. Another important issue is the information 
asymmetry between private equity sponsors, lead arrangers and participants in the loan. 
Furthermore, the restrictiveness of financial covenants might be related to additional 
contractual clauses. The reason is that financial covenants might serve as guard posts in the 
relationship between arranger and participant, while less transparent agreements are set 
between arranger and sponsor to the detriment of the syndicate participants. 
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Figure I 
EXEMPLARY EXCERPT OF FINANCIAL COVENANTS IN A CREDIT AGREEMENT 
 
   
1.  FINANCIAL COVENANTS 
1.1  Financial condition  
The Company shall ensure that: 
(a)  the ratio of Consolidated Cash Flow to Net Debt Service will not be less than 1:1 for any 
Relevant Period. 
(b)  the ratio of Debt on each Relevant Date set out in the table below to EBITDA for the 
Relevant Period ending on that Relevant Date will not exceed the ratio set out in the 
relevant column in the table below opposite that Relevant Date; 
(c)  the ratio of EBITDA to Interest for each Relevant Period ending on a Relevant Date set 
out in the table below will not be less than the ratio set out in the relevant column in the 
table below opposite that Relevant Date; 
Relevant Date  Debt to EBITDA   EBITDA to Interest 
30 June 2010  7.60 : 1  1.90 : 1 
30 September 2010  7.50 : 1  1.90 : 1 
31 December 2010  7.20 : 1  2.00 : 1 
31 March 2011  7.10 : 1  2.00 : 1 
30 June 2011  6.80 : 1  2.00 : 1 
30 September 2011  6.70 : 1  2.00 : 1 
31 December 2011  6.50 : 1  2.00 : 1 
31 March 2012  6.30 : 1  2.00 : 1 
30 June 2012  6.10 : 1  2.00 : 1 
30 September 2012  5.90 : 1  2.00 : 1 












FORMALIZATION OF HEADROOM CALCULATION 
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Input from Financing Case
Debt Forecast 126,788 125,771 123,800 122,776 120,758 119,686 117,461
EBITDA Forecast 22,250 22,500 22,850 23,200 23,550 23,900 24,275
D/EBITDA forecast Forecast 5.7x 5.6x 5.4x 5.3x 5.1x 5.0x 4.8x
Senior Debt Covenants
Headroom (% Change in EBITDA) Input 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25%
Allowed EBITDA Calc 16,688 16,875 17,138 17,400 17,663 17,925 18,206
D/EBITDA Covenant Calc 7.6x 7.5x 7.2x 7.1x 6.8x 6.7x 6.5x
EBITDA/I COVENANT
Input from Financing Case
EBITDA Forecast 22,250 22,500 22,850 23,200 23,550 23,900 24,275
Interest Forecast 8,826 8,808 8,788 8,856 8,810 8,762 8,818
EBITDA/I forecast Forecast 2.5x 2.6x 2.6x 2.6x 2.7x 2.7x 2.8x
Senior Debt Covenants
Headroom (% Change in EBITDA) Input 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25%
Allowed EBITDA Calc 16,688 16,875 17,138 17,400 17,663 17,925 18,206
EBITDA/I Covenant Calc 1.9x 1.9x 2.0x 2.0x 2.0x 2.0x 2.1x





Panel A presents the € volumes of LBOs in the sample in relation to the German and Western European LBO 
market by year. Volume figures are in millions €, based on 2008 prices. Comparisons to market studies are in 
percent. The sample includes 109 private equity backed LBOs completed in Germany between July 2000 and 
August 2008. Due to comparability to the benchmarks, recapitalizations are excluded. Total enterprise value 
excludes transaction costs (due diligence, arrangement fees etc.). Information on market figures is obtained from 
two sources. First, market data is aggregated from the Centre for Management Buy-out Research (CMBOR) at 
Nottingham University Business School and includes all PE and non-PE sponsored LBOs larger than €10 million 
in transaction value completed in Germany, and Western Europe respectively, over the entire sample period. 
Year 2008 market figures are for the first 6 months only. Second, the sample is compared to the comprehensive 
dataset of Strömberg (2008) covering the period 2001-2007. Panel B benchmarks the distribution of buyout 
types in our sample with those of the aforementioned studies. Here, we resort to the global data of the dataset by 
Strömberg (2008). In divisional buyouts the PE sponsor acquires only a part of the company. Private-to-private 
transactions refer to acquisitions of non-listed companies. In turn, public-to-privates are delistings of previously 
public companies. In secondary buyouts the companies were owned by institutional investors, e.g. other PE 











EV Sample coverage (EV) of
2000 1 77 0.4% 0.1% 0.1%
2001 2 3366 42.3% 5.4% 5.4%
2002 6 4874 51.4% 7.3% 6.7%
2003 7 3197 24.1% 4.9% 4.7%
2004 17 13838 67.5% 16.8% 11.6%
2005 19 8769 60.5% 6.8% 4.6%
2006 26 6792 27.8% 4.0% 2.6%
2007 24 13947 52.7% 8.1% 8.2%
2008 7 2756 42.9% 7.4% NA
Total 109 57540 40.2% 6.7% approx. 5.8%
6.7%
Panel B: Benchmarking by type of deal
Divisional 39 35.8% 54.0% 39.6% 36.3%
Private-to-private 38 34.9% 17.8% 44.6% 36.9%
Public-to-private 2 1.8% 1.5% 2.4% 6.8%
Secondary 29 26.6% 13.2% 14.8% 16.8%
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Table II 
KEY VALUATION AND FINANCING DATA 
The Table presents market trends in Germany during the July 2000 to August 2008 period for 130 PE sponsored 
LBOs and recaps. Transaction total capital equals transaction total sources (or uses). Transaction value 
(enterprise value) excludes transaction costs. Net debt equals total debt less cash and cash equivalents. Senior 
debt includes term loan facilities (A, B, C, and D tranches) as well as second-lien loans but excludes revolving 
credit facilities. EBITDA equals the pro-forma figure for the end of fiscal year of the transaction (t=0). Equity 
contribution is the equity to transaction total capital ratio with equity including common and preferred equity, 
earn-outs as well as shareholder and vendor loans. The bottom panel reports time trends for our variables across 
the following three periods which approximate the private equity cycle: 2000 to 2003 (pre credit boom), 2004 to 
2007 (credit boom) and 2008 (post credit boom). We test the significance of our time trends with Wilcoxon rank-


















Leverage      




(€ millions) x x (as % of total capital)
2000 Median 1 65.0 6.5 3.9 33.1
2001 Median 2 1493.6 5.9 3.6 37.6
2002 Median 6 332.3 7.7 3.9 46.6
2003 Median 7 55.4 4.7 3.3 43.1
2004 Median 20 705.0 7.3 4.6 30.4
2005 Median 28 252.5 7.0 4.3 27.7
2006 Median 30 123.6 6.6 4.4 32.6
2007 Median 29 202.0 7.6 4.8 33.1
2008 Median 7 273.1 7.9 4.1 37.5
Total Median 130 230.5 6.9 4.3 33.5
Time trends:
Pre credit boom (00-03) VS. credit boom (04-07) (-) (+) (+)** (-)***
Credit boom (04-07) VS. post credit boom (08) (+) (-) (-) (+)***43 
 
Table III 
DETAILED FINANCING DATA - SPREADS AND MATURITIES 
The Table presents annual means and medians of maturity and spreads of the financial sources used in our sample of 130 LBOs arranged between July 2000 and August 2008. 
The bottom panel reports time trends for our variables across the following three periods which approximate the private equity cycle: 2000 to 2003 (pre credit boom), 2004 to 
2007 (credit boom) and 2008 (post credit boom). We test the significance of our time trends with Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
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(months) (as %) (months) (as %) (months) (as %) (months) (as %) (in months) (as %) (as %) (as %) (as %) (as %)
2000 Median 72.0 2.50 84.0 3.00 116.0 4.15 . 2.95 2.66 2.18
n 1111 11 111
2001 Median 84.0 2.25 96.0 2.75 108.0 3.38 . . 120.0 5.00 3.00 3.27 2.60 9.40
n 222222. .111222
2002 Median 84.0 2.25 96.0 2.75 108.0 3.25 . . 120.0 5.00 4.50 3.96 2.55 5.68
n 666633. .555666
2003 Median 84.0 2.50 96.0 2.75 108.0 3.25 . . 108.0 5.00 5.00 3.04 2.55 3.67
n 775533. .333677
2004 Median 84.0 2.25 96.0 2.75 108.0 3.25 114.0 5.50 120.0 5.00 6.00 3.94 2.63 1.77
n 20 20 19 19 18 18 3 4 11 12 12 19 19 20
2005 Median 84.0 2.25 96.0 2.75 108.0 3.25 114.0 5.50 120.0 4.75 5.50 3.53 2.67 2.40
n 28 28 28 28 25 25 11 10 18 17 17 26 26 28
2006 Median 84.0 2.25 96.0 2.75 108.0 3.06 114.0 4.75 120.0 4.50 5.25 2.93 2.53 1.86
n 27 27 29 29 18 18 6 6 16 15 16 28 30 30
2007 Median 84.0 2.25 96.0 2.75 108.0 3.19 114.0 4.50 120.0 4.35 5.13 3.43 2.56 1.32
n 25 25 29 29 20 20 9 8 14 16 16 27 27 29
2008 Median 84.0 2.50 96.0 3.00 108.0 3.50 . . 120.0 4.50 5.50 4.42 2.94 4.74
n 777777. .555777
Total Median 84.0 2.25 96.0 2.75 108.0 3.25 114.0 4.75 120.0 4.50 5.25 3.45 2.61 2.12
n 123 123 126 126 96 96 29 28 74 75 75 122 125 130
Time trends:
Pre credit boom (00-03) VS. credit boom (04-07) (+)** (-)*** (+) (-)*** (+) (-)** n.m. n.m. (+)*** (-)*** (+) (-) (+) (-)***
Credit boom (04-07) VS. post credit boom (08) (+) (+)*** (-) (+)*** (-) (+)*** n.m. n.m. (+) (+) (-) (+)** (+)*** (+)***44 
 
Table IV 
FREQUENCY OF FINANCIAL COVENANTS 
The Table presents the inclusion of financial covenants in (1) 130 PE sponsored loans, (2) 1423 non-sponsored term loans 
and (3) 355 non-sponsored term loans which represent the highest borrower D/EV quartile of the second sample. Following 
previous research (Chava and Roberts, 2008; Demerjian, 2010), the classification scheme by DealScan and discussions 
with industry experts, we consider the following set of seven financial covenants in our analysis: (1) Debt to EBITDA 
(D/EBITDA), (2) EBITDA to Interest (EBITDA/I), (3) Unlevered Cash Flow to Debt Service (CashFlowCoverage), (4) 
Capex, (5) Net Worth, (6) Debt to Equity (D/E) and (7) Current Ratio covenants. Panel A presents the covenant frequency 
in the cross-section, while Panel B depicts the covenant frequency over time, i.e. over the following three time periods: 
2000 to 2003 (pre-credit boom), 2004 to 2007 (credit boom), and 2008 (post-credit boom). Panel C documents the financial 
risk of the borrowers in terms of D/EBITDA and D/EV. The Debt component includes the revolving credit facility to 
ensure comparability. The Wilcoxon tests refer to the differences between the sponsored loan sample and (a) the entire 








Variables Unit Sponsored loans Non-sponsored loans Non-sponsored loans
Spons. VS All Non-Spons.
Spons. VS Highest Lev.-
Quart. Non-Spons.
Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median
Panel A: Covenant frequency in the cross section
No. of financial covenants # 129 3.64 4.00 1,423 2.81 3.00 355 2.78 3.00 0.00*** 0.00***
D/EBITDA % 129 97% 100% 1,423 71% 100% 355 59% 100% 0.00*** 0.00***
EBITDA/I % 129 80% 100% 1,423 46% 0% 355 50% 0% 0.00*** 0.00***
Cash flow % 129 97% 100% 1,423 56% 100% 355 52% 100% 0.00*** 0.00***
Capex % 129 74% 100% 1,423 40% 0% 355 49% 0% 0.00*** 0.00***
D/E % 129 0% 0% 1,423 15% 0% 355 17% 0% 0.00*** 0.00***
Current Ratio % 129 0% 0% 1,423 5% 0% 355 3% 0% 0.00*** 0.07*
Net Worth % 129 0% 0% 1,423 29% 0% 355 30% 0% 0.00*** 0.00***
Panel B:  Covenant frequency over time
2000 - 03
No. of financial covenants # 16 3.94 4.00 595 3.09 3.00 199 2.97 3.00 0.00*** 0.00***
D/EBITDA % 16 88% 100% 595 65% 100% 199 52% 100% 0.06* 0.01**
EBITDA/I % 16 100% 100% 595 46% 0% 199 51% 100% 0.00*** 0.00***
Cash flow % 16 100% 100% 595 64% 100% 199 58% 100% 0.00*** 0.00***
Capex % 16 69% 100% 595 45% 0% 199 50% 100% 0.06* 0.16
D/E % 16 0% 0% 595 22% 0% 199 22% 0% 0.04** 0.04**
Current Ratio % 16 0% 0% 595 8% 0% 199 3% 0% 0.24 0.52
Net Worth % 16 13% 0% 595 42% 0% 199 41% 0% 0.02** 0.03**
2004 - 07
No. of financial covenants # 106 3.58 4.00 748 2.62 3.00 132 2.54 3.00 0.00*** 0.00***
D/EBITDA % 106 96% 100% 748 77% 100% 132 67% 100% 0.00*** 0.00***
EBITDA/I % 106 75% 100% 748 46% 0% 132 49% 0% 0.00*** 0.00***
Cash flow % 106 96% 100% 748 50% 100% 132 44% 0% 0.00*** 0.00***
Capex % 106 74% 100% 748 39% 0% 132 49% 0% 0.00*** 0.00***
D/E % 106 0% 0% 748 10% 0% 132 8% 0% 0.00*** 0.00***
Current Ratio % 106 0% 0% 748 4% 0% 132 2% 0% 0.05** 0.20
Net Worth % 106 2% 0% 748 19% 0% 132 15% 0% 0.00*** 0.00***
No. of financial covenants # 7 4.00 4.00 80 2.36 2.00 24 2.58 3.00 0.00*** 0.00***
D/EBITDA % 7 100% 100% 80 73% 100% 24 67% 100% 0.11 0.08*
EBITDA/I % 7 100% 100% 80 44% 0% 24 42% 0% 0.00*** 0.00***
Cash flow % 7 100% 100% 80 43% 0% 24 46% 0% 0.00*** 0.01**
Capex % 7 100% 100% 80 21% 0% 24 33% 0% 0.00*** 0.00***
D/E % 7 0% 0% 80 18% 0% 24 25% 0% 0.23 0.15
C u r r e n t  R a t i o % 7 0 %0 % 8 05 %0 % 2 48 %0 % 0 . 5 5 0 . 4 4
Net Worth % 7 0% 0% 80 23% 0% 24 21% 0% 0.16 0.19
Panel C:  Financial risk of borrowers
D/EV # 129 0.65 0.66 1,423 0.37 0.33 355 0.68 0.65 0.00*** 0.30
D/EBITDA # 129 5.48 5.35 1,295 3.47 2.87 305 5.64 5.08 0.00*** 0.35






CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL COVENANTS 
The Table presents conditional probabilities on encountering a covenant conditional on the existence of another covenant. 
Following previous research (Chava and Roberts, 2008; Demerjian, 2010), the classification scheme by DealScan and 
discussions with industry experts, we consider the following set of seven financial covenants in our analysis: (1) Debt to 
EBITDA (D/EBITDA), (2) EBITDA to Interest (EBITDA/I), (3) Unlevered Cash Flow to Debt Service 
(CashFlowCoverage), (4) Capex, (5) Net Worth, (6) Debt to Equity (D/E) and (7) Current Ratio covenants. Panel A (B) 
reports evidence for our sponsored (non-sponsored) loans. 
 
Panel A: Sponsored loans
Probability of a covenant in row i, conditional of a covenant in column j
C o v e n a n t 1234567
1 D/EBITDA 0.81 0.98 0.77 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 EBITDA/I 0.97 0.97 0.88 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 Cash flow 0.97 0.80 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 Capex 0.98 0.94 0.97 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 D/Equity 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
6 Current ratio 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 Net worth 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B: Non-sponsored loans
Probability of a covenant in row i, conditional of a covenant in column j
C o v e n a n t 1234567
1 D/EBITDA 0.51 0.57 0.45 0.06 0.05 0.22
2 EBITDA/I 0.69 0.32 0.36 0.15 0.10 0.28
3 Cash flow 0.64 0.27 0.45 0.16 0.06 0.34
4 Capex 0.67 0.40 0.61 0.07 0.04 0.26
5 D/Equity 0.21 0.38 0.51 0.17 0.15 0.53
6 Current ratio 0.30 0.46 0.33 0.17 0.26 0.58
7 Net worth 0.34 0.31 0.47 0.27 0.23 0.1546 
 
Table VI 
THE MENU OF FINANCIAL COVENANTS 
The Table presents descriptive statistics on the most frequent covenant combinations encountered in our sponsored and 
non-sponsored loan samples. Following previous research (Chava and Roberts, 2008; Demerjian, 2010), the classification 
scheme by DealScan and discussions with industry experts, we consider the following set of seven financial covenants in 
our analysis: (1) Debt to EBITDA (D/EBITDA), (2) EBITDA to Interest (EBITDA/I), (3) Unlevered Cash Flow to Debt 









Frequency of top 3 covenant combinations %
Frequency of premier covenant combination %





















THRESHOLDS OF FINANCIAL COVENANTS 
The Table presents covenant thresholds for our sponsored and non-sponsored samples. We present means and medians for the three main covenants, i.e. the (1) Debt to 
EBITDA (D/EBITDA), (2) EBITDA to Interest (EBITDA/I), (3) Unlevered Cash Flow to Debt Service (CashFlowCoverage),covenant. Panel A presents thresholds for the 
cross-section, while Panel B depicts thresholds over time, i.e. over the following three time periods: 2000 to 2003 (pre-credit boom), 2004 to 2007 (credit boom), and 2008 
(post-credit boom). Statistics on the financial risk of the borrowers (D/EV and D/EBITDA) are included as well. The Wilcoxon tests refer to the differences between the 
sponsored loan sample and the highest (fourth) D/EV quartile of the non-sponsored sample.   
 
 
Sponsored loans Non-sponsored loans
Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test*
1. Quartile 2. Quartile 3. Quartile
Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Obs. Mean Median
Financials
D/EV 129 0.65 0.66 1,423 0.37 0.33 0.11 0.11 0.26 0.26 0.42 0.42 355 0.68 0.65 0.30
D/EBITDA 129 5.48 5.35 1,295 3.47 2.87 1.44 1.19 2.98 2.39 4.03 3.64 305 5.64 5.08 0.35
Covenant thresholds
Panel A: Cross section
D/EBITDA 123 5.02 4.75 1,015 4.27 4.00 3.39 3.25 4.10 3.75 4.55 4.50 208 5.30 5.00 0.11
EBITDA/I 103 2.78 2.50 649 2.52 2.50 2.98 3.00 2.75 2.75 2.43 2.50 177 2.03 2.00 0.00***
Cash flow 125 1.02 1.00 790 1.34 1.25 1.45 1.25 1.29 1.20 1.35 1.25 185 1.27 1.20 0.00***
Panel B:  Time series
Pre credit boom (00-03) 
D/EBITDA 14 4.04 3.95 384 4.22 4.00 3.03 3.00 4.18 3.50 4.31 4.05 104 5.09 5.00 0.01**
EBITDA/I 16 3.58 3.23 271 2.42 2.25 2.98 3.00 2.78 3.00 2.37 2.45 102 2.01 1.90 0.00***
Cash flow 16 1.05 1.00 381 1.34 1.25 1.44 1.35 1.32 1.25 1.36 1.25 116 1.27 1.15 0.00***
Credit boom (04-07)
D/EBITDA 102 5.16 4.90 573 4.36 4.00 3.55 3.25 4.08 0.00 4.80 4.60 88 5.74 5.50 0.02**
EBITDA/I 80 2.65 2.33 343 2.57 2.50 2.98 3.00 2.72 2.75 2.44 2.50 65 1.99 2.00 0.00***
Cash flow 102 1.02 1.00 375 1.33 1.25 1.46 1.25 1.27 1.20 1.30 1.25 58 1.23 1.15 0.00***
D/EBITDA 7 4.87 4.19 58 3.74 3.50 3.45 3.38 3.68 0.00 3.44 3.50 16 4.29 4.00 0.42
EBITDA/I 7 2.50 2.50 35 2.73 3.00 2.93 3.00 2.77 3.00 2.52 2.75 10 2.52 2.50 0.73
Cash flow 7 1.00 1.00 34 1.51 1.30 1.59 1.35 1.34 1.25 1.74 1.25 11 1.40 1.50 0.00***
* Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test between entire sponsored loans sample and 4th quartile (highest D/EV) of non-sponsored loans sample.
All 4. Quartile
p value
Post credit boom (08)48 
 
Table VIII 
DEVELOPMENT OF COVENANT RESTRICTIVENESS MEASURES  
The Table presents the thresholds (Panel A) and headrooms (Panel B) determined in the loan contracts to be obeyed one year (t 
= 1), two years (t = 2), and three years (t = 3) after the transaction was completed. We present means and medians for the three 
main covenants, i.e. the (1) Debt to EBITDA (D/EBITDA), (2) EBITDA to Interest (EBITDA/I), (3) Unlevered Cash Flow to 
Debt Service (CashFlowCoverage) covenants, The bottom panel reports time trends for our variables across the following three 
periods which approximate the private equity cycle: 2000 to 2003 (pre credit boom), 2004 to 2007 (credit boom) and 2008 
(post credit boom). We test the significance of our time trends with Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 




Panel A: Covenant thresholds
Deal year Statistics D/EBITDA EBITDA/I CashFlowCoverage
t=1 t=2 t=3 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=1 t=2 t=3
2000 Median 3.40 2.80 2.40 2.20 2.40 2.60 1.05 1.05 1.10
n 111 111 111
2001 Median 4.83 4.30 3.68 2.68 3.00 3.30 1.00 1.00 1.00
n 222 222 111
2002 Median 4.05 3.40 2.85 3.03 3.50 4.05 1.00 1.00 1.03
n 666 666 666
2003 Median 3.85 3.20 3.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 1.08 1.10 1.15
n 555 777 666
2004 Median 5.30 4.55 4.10 2.50 2.90 3.25 1.00 1.00 1.00
n 20 20 20 19 19 19 18 18 18
2005 Median 4.60 4.25 3.82 2.58 2.68 2.97 1.00 1.00 1.00
n 25 25 25 20 20 20 26 26 26
2006 Median 4.50 3.90 3.30 2.68 2.85 3.15 1.00 1.00 1.00
n 31 31 31 20 20 20 31 31 31
2007 Median 5.30 4.40 4.20 2.05 2.26 2.44 1.00 1.00 1.00
n 28 28 27 22 22 22 29 29 29
2008 Median 4.15 3.38 3.00 2.50 2.70 2.90 1.00 1.00 1.00
n 888 777 888
Total Median 4.60 4.10 3.50 2.50 2.70 2.97 1.00 1.00 1.00
Std. 1.83 1.73 1.56 1.13 1.29 1.34 0.05 0.06 0.06
n 126 126 125 104 104 104 126 126 126
Time trends:
Pre credit boom (00-03) VS. credit boom (04-07) (+)** (+)** (+)** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)** (-)***
Credit boom (04-07) VS. post credit boom (08) (-) (-) (-) (+) (+) (+) (-) (-) (-)
Panel B: Covenant headrooms
Deal year Statistics D/EBITDA EBITDA/I CashFlowCoverage
t=1 t=2 t=3 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=1 t=2 t=3
2000 Median 13.6 18.8 28.0 20.1 27.10 34.50 25.00 9.00 25.00
2001 Median 20.2 22.5 19.2 22.0 21.10 26.55 51.00 34.00 26.00
2002 Median 25.1 27.9 31.4 22.1 20.40 26.80 25.00 27.50 31.50
2003 Median 19.8 22.7 38.2 24.3 38.31 54.67 23.63 27.06 26.62
2004 Median 25.1 26.9 28.0 25.9 26.20 24.40 33.15 29.21 30.50
2005 Median 20.9 25.0 26.9 20.3 20.85 21.25 28.73 29.00 32.77
2006 Median 21.9 24.1 30.0 24.0 25.40 28.15 34.02 31.25 31.25
2007 Median 26.3 28.5 30.1 25.8 26.06 27.31 27.89 34.00 33.48
2008 Median 24.2 26.0 25.8 22.4 25.00 25.20 27.50 27.28 34.19
Total Median 23.3 25.9 29.3 24.0 25.00 26.00 28.73 29.92 32.12
Std. 8.35 11.37 14.44 10.76 10.62 12.42 15.83 11.66 12.48
n 126 126 125 104 104 104 126 126 126
Time trends:
Pre credit boom (00-03) VS. credit boom (04-07) (+) (+) (-) (+) (-) (-)** (+) (+) (+)
Credit boom (04-07) VS. post credit boom (08) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (+)49 
 
Table IX 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES OF COVENANT RESTRICTIVENESS  
The Table presents financial risk and information asymmetry cost proxies. Panel A reports summary statistics and Panel B 
focuses on the correlations for the information asymmetry costs proxies. D/ EBITDA represents net debt divided by earnings 
before interest and depreciation at transaction date. D/EV equals net debt debt divided by enterprise value. Private equity group 
(PEG) size measures the sum of capital committed to the the private equity groups funds over the last five years before the 
transaction. PEG lifetime represents the age of the private equity organization at transaction date. PEG number counts the 
number of transactions a PEG was able to complete before the respective deal in our sample. Banking relationship is defined as 
the value of loans in the previous five years underwritten by the lead arranging bank divided by the total value of all loans 
sponsored by the respective private equity group as reported in DealScan. *, ** and *** indicate p-values of 10 percent, 5 










Panel A: Summary statistics for the financial risk and information asymmetry costs proxies
Obs. 25% Median Mean 75% SD
Financial risk variables
D/EBITDA (t=0) 130 3.3 4.3 4.4 5.4 1.5
D/EV (t=0) 130 58.9% 66.3% 65.6% 72.5% 9.6%
Information asymmetry variables
PEG size (€ millions) 130 91.3 1,316.4 3,033.5 3,936.4 4,961.1
PEG lifetime 130 6.0 13.0 15.6 24.0 12.3
PEG number of deals 130 5.0 11.0 17.4 28.0 17.3
Banking relationship 130 0.0 16.3% 23.2% 34.7% 26.5%
Panel B: Correlation of information asymmetry costs proxies
Information asymmetry measure
Information asymmetry measure (1) (2) (3)
(1) PEG size 1
(2) PEG lifetime 0.69 *** 1
(3) PEG number of deals 0.62*** 0.77*** 150 
 
Table X 
REGRESSION RESULTS D/EBITDA HEADROOM 
 The Table presents the results of ordinary least squares regressions on the determinants of leverage covenant (D/EBITDA) 
headroom using a sample of 130 PE sponsored LBOs and recapitalizations completed between July 2000 and August 2008. 
Leverage headroom is the permitted percentage reduction of forecasted EBITDA before breaching the leverage covenant. For 
each transaction we select the tightest leverage headroom of the first two years following the transaction as the measure of 
maximal restrictiveness. As proxy for Private Equity group (PEG) reputation we use assets under management, i.e. the 
aggregated funds raised within the five years prior to the transaction in billions of € as reported by 
ThomsonVentureEconomics. In case more than one PE sponsor is involved in the transaction, it is resorted to the largest sum 
of funds raised. Leverage is defined as net debt to EBITDA ratio at transaction. Profitability is measured by return on sales 
defined as the EBITDA to sales ratio as of transaction year. We use the projected compounded average growth (CAGR) rate of 
EBITDA from transaction year to the following three years as measure of growth opportunities. Credit risk spread is defined as 
the difference between of AAA and BB rated corporate bonds, which are obtained from the Merrill Lynch Global Index 
System. Strict EBITDA definition is a dummy variable assigned a value of one if the underlying EBITDA definition contains 
less add-backs than the LMA standard contract and zero otherwise. Accordingly, loose EBITDA definition represents deals 
with more add-backs. Small cap deals are those with a total transaction value (equity plus net debt plus transaction costs) of 
less than €100m, mid cap deals (the reference category) range from €100m to €500m, and large cap deals exceed €500m. Net 
debt equals total debt less cash and cash equivalents. The bold numbers in the upper rows represent the regression coefficients. 
T-statistics are shown in the lower rows. Those in model 1 to 3 are calculated based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors, while those in model 4 are clustered both at the deal year as well as industry (fixed effects) using the method of 




VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PEG Size 0.003*** 0.002** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002**
(3.46) (2.07) (3.48) (2.63) (2.03)
D/EBITDA -0.007* -0.008* -0.007* -0.007***
(-1.91) (-1.97) (-1.85) (-3.42)
D/EV -0.133*
(-1.69)
Profitability 0.191* 0.180* 0.194* 0.219** 0.219**
(1.89) (1.69) (1.89) (2.11) (2.15)
EBITDA Growth (3 yrs) 0.003** 0.002** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003***
(2.51) (2.01) (2.60) (2.51) (2.74)
Credit Spread -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(-0.96) (-1.42) (-1.18) (-1.09) (-0.95)
Small Cap -0.004 -0.005 -0.005
(-0.26) (-0.32) (-0.53)
Large Cap 0.005 -0.001 -0.001
(0.40) (-0.09) (-0.09)
Strict EBITDA Definition -0.019 -0.019*
(-1.13) (-1.74)
Loose EBITDA Defnition 0.016 0.016
(1.05) (0.78)
Industry Fixed Effects No No No No Yes
T i m e  F i x e d  E f f e c t s N oN oN oN oY e s
Constant 0.204*** 0.271*** 0.207*** 0.202*** 0.202***
(12.51) (5.38) (13.34) (13.02) (9.74)
Observations 126 116 126 125 125
R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.19
t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.151 
 
5.  Appendix  
 
Appendix I 
FREQUENCY OF FINANCIAL COVENANTS (ACQUISITION LOANS BENCHMARK) 
The Table presents the inclusion of financial covenants in (1) 130 PE sponsored loan deals, (2) 795 non-sponsored loan deals 
for the purpose of corporate acquisitions (3) 196 non-sponsored loan deals for the purpose of corporate acquisitions which 
represent the highest borrower D/EV quartile of the second sample. Following previous research (Chava and Roberts, 2008; 
Demerjian, 2010), the classification scheme by DealScan and discussions with industry experts, we consider the following set 
of seven financial covenants in our analysis: (1) Debt to EBITDA (D/EBITDA), (2) EBITDA to Interest (EBITDA/I), (3) 
Unlevered Cash Flow to Debt Service (CashFlowCoverage), (4) Capex, (5) Net Worth, (6) Debt to Equity (D/E) and (7) 
Current Ratio covenants. Panel A presents the covenant frequency in the cross-section, while Panel B depicts the covenant 
frequency over time, i.e. over the following three time periods: 2000 to 2003 (pre-credit boom), 2004 to 2007 (credit boom), 
and 2008 (post-credit boom). Panel C documents the financial risk of the borrowers. The Wilcoxon tests refer to the 
differences between the sponsored loan sample and (a) the entire sample of non-sponsored loans and (b) the highest (fourth) 





Variables Unit Sponsored loans Non-sponsored loans
Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median
Panel A: Covenant frequency in the cross section
No. of financial covenants # 129 3.64 4.00 795 3.64 3.00 196 2.73 3.00 0.00*** 0.00***
D/EBITDA % 129 97% 100% 795 72% 100% 196 62% 100% 0.00*** 0.00***
EBITDA/I % 129 80% 100% 795 46% 0% 196 52% 100% 0.00*** 0.00***
Cash flow % 129 97% 100% 795 51% 100% 196 55% 100% 0.00*** 0.00***
Capex % 129 74% 100% 795 28% 0% 196 30% 0% 0.00*** 0.00***
D/E % 129 0% 0% 795 18% 0% 196 22% 0% 0.00*** 0.00***
Current Ratio % 129 0% 0% 795 8% 0% 196 8% 0% 0.00*** 0.00***
Net Worth % 129 0% 0% 795 28% 0% 196 28% 0% 0.00*** 0.00***
Panel B:  Covenant frequency over time
Pre credit boom (00-03) 
No. of financial covenants # 16 3.94 4.00 312 2.89 3.00 96 2.88 3.00 0.00*** 0.00***
D/EBITDA % 16 88% 100% 312 64% 100% 96 51% 100% 0.06* 0.01**
EBITDA/I % 16 100% 100% 312 46% 0% 96 57% 100% 0.00*** 0.00***
Cash flow % 16 100% 100% 312 58% 100% 96 63% 100% 0.00*** 0.01**
Capex % 16 69% 100% 312 27% 0% 96 24% 0% 0.00*** 0.00***
D/E % 16 0% 0% 312 27% 0% 96 30% 0% 0.02** 0.01**
Current Ratio % 16 0% 0% 312 10% 0% 96 5% 0% 0.19 0.35
Net Worth % 16 13% 0% 312 43% 0% 96 43% 0% 0.02** 0.02**
Credit boom (04-07)
No. of financial covenants # 106 3.58 4.00 419 2.48 2.00 70 2.66 3.00 0.00*** 0.00***
D/EBITDA % 106 96% 100% 419 77% 100% 70 71% 100% 0.00*** 0.00***
EBITDA/I % 106 75% 100% 419 46% 0% 70 49% 0% 0.00*** 0.00***
Cash flow % 106 96% 100% 419 47% 0% 70 50% 50% 0.00*** 0.00***
Capex % 106 74% 100% 419 29% 0% 70 39% 0% 0.00*** 0.00***
D/E % 106 0% 0% 419 12% 0% 70 16% 0% 0.00*** 0.00***
Current Ratio % 106 0% 0% 419 6% 0% 70 9% 0% 0.01** 0.00***
Net Worth % 106 2% 0% 419 18% 0% 70 11% 0% 0.00*** 0.01**
No. of financial covenants # 7 4.00 4.00 64 2.45 2.00 30 2.47 2.00 0.00*** 0.00***
D/EBITDA % 7 100% 100% 64 77% 100% 30 73% 100% 0.15 0.13
EBITDA/I % 7 100% 100% 64 44% 0% 30 43% 0% 0.01** 0.01**
Cash flow % 7 100% 100% 64 44% 0% 30 43% 0% 0.01** 0.01**
Capex % 7 100% 100% 64 27% 0% 30 30% 0% 0.00*** 0.00***
D/E % 7 0% 0% 64 13% 0% 30 10% 0% 0.32 0.39
Current Ratio % 7 0% 0% 64 11% 0% 30 13% 0% 0.36 0.31
Net Worth % 7 0% 0% 64 19% 0% 30 20% 0% 0.21 0.20
Panel C:  Financial risk of borrowers
D/EV # 129 0.65 0.66 795 0.32 0.30 196 0.59 0.56 0.00*** 0.00***
D/EBITDA # 129 5.48 5.35 723 3.69 3.14 164 5.74 5.32 0.00*** 0.86












THRESHOLDS OF FINANCIAL COVENANTS (ACQUISITION LOANS BENCHMARK) 
The Table presents covenant thresholds for our sponsored and non-sponsored samples. We present means and medians for the three main covenants, i.e. the (1) Debt to 
EBITDA (D/EBITDA), (2) EBITDA to Interest (EBITDA/I), (3) Unlevered Cash Flow to Debt Service (CashFlowCoverage),covenant. Panel A presents thresholds for the 
cross-section, while Panel B depicts thresholds over time, i.e. over the following three time periods: 2000 to 2003 (pre-credit boom), 2004 to 2007 (credit boom), and 2008 
(post-credit boom). Statistics on the financial risk of the borrowers (D/EV and D/EBITDA) are included as well. The Wilcoxon tests refer to the differences between the 
sponsored loan sample and the highest (fourth) D/EV quartile of the non-sponsored sample.   
 
 
Sponsored loans Non-sponsored loans
Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test*
1. Quartile 2. Quartile 3. Quartile
Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Obs. Mean Median
Financials
D/EV 129 0.65 0.66 1,423 0.37 0.33 0.11 0.11 0.26 0.26 0.42 0.42 355 0.68 0.65 0.30
D/EBITDA 129 5.48 5.35 1,295 3.47 2.87 1.44 1.19 2.98 2.39 4.03 3.64 305 5.64 5.08 0.35
Covenant thresholds
Panel A: Cross section
D/EBITDA 123 5.02 4.75 1,015 4.27 4.00 3.39 3.25 4.10 3.75 4.55 4.50 208 5.30 5.00 0.11
EBITDA/I 103 2.78 2.50 649 2.52 2.50 2.98 3.00 2.75 2.75 2.43 2.50 177 2.03 2.00 0.00***
Cash flow 125 1.02 1.00 790 1.34 1.25 1.45 1.25 1.29 1.20 1.35 1.25 185 1.27 1.20 0.00***
Panel B:  Time series
Pre credit boom (00-03) 
D/EBITDA 14 4.04 3.95 384 4.22 4.00 3.03 3.00 4.18 3.50 4.31 4.05 104 5.09 5.00 0.01**
EBITDA/I 16 3.58 3.23 271 2.42 2.25 2.98 3.00 2.78 3.00 2.37 2.45 102 2.01 1.90 0.00***
Cash flow 16 1.05 1.00 381 1.34 1.25 1.44 1.35 1.32 1.25 1.36 1.25 116 1.27 1.15 0.00***
Credit boom (04-07)
D/EBITDA 102 5.16 4.90 573 4.36 4.00 3.55 3.25 4.08 0.00 4.80 4.60 88 5.74 5.50 0.02**
EBITDA/I 80 2.65 2.33 343 2.57 2.50 2.98 3.00 2.72 2.75 2.44 2.50 65 1.99 2.00 0.00***
Cash flow 102 1.02 1.00 375 1.33 1.25 1.46 1.25 1.27 1.20 1.30 1.25 58 1.23 1.15 0.00***
D/EBITDA 7 4.87 4.19 58 3.74 3.50 3.45 3.38 3.68 0.00 3.44 3.50 16 4.29 4.00 0.42
EBITDA/I 7 2.50 2.50 35 2.73 3.00 2.93 3.00 2.77 3.00 2.52 2.75 10 2.52 2.50 0.73
Cash flow 7 1.00 1.00 34 1.51 1.30 1.59 1.35 1.34 1.25 1.74 1.25 11 1.40 1.50 0.00***
* Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test between entire sponsored loans sample and 4th quartile (highest D/EV) of non-sponsored loans sample.
All 4. Quartile
p value
Post credit boom (08)53 
 
Appendix III 







Variables Unit Sponsored loans Non-sponsored loans
Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median
Size
Sales mio. € 129 568.6 276.4 1,420 1686.11 370.47 355 1997.18 423.39
EBITDA mio. € 129 75.5 34.9 1,359 261.93 58.14 326 267.05 73.76
Financial risk
D/EV # 129 0.65 0.66 1,423 0.37 0.33 355 0.68 0.65
D/EBITDA # 129 5.48 5.35 1,295 3.47 2.87 305 5.64 5.08
Loan Characteristics
Loan package mio. € 129 422.9 178.5 1332.0 621.8 171.6 331.0 485.5 141.5
Weighted Spread basis points 129 267.37 265.12 1,332 192.57 162.50 331 191.77 162.50
Weighted Maturity months 126 82.3 84.0 783 40.66 36.00 193 39.45 36.00
Non-sponsored loans
All Highest Leverage Quartile